Success of Science
(2) Naturalism is the best explanation for the fact that science has been so successful without the supernatural.[14]

Imagine a library that contains textbooks for all of the sciences—such as physics, chemistry, and biology—and summarizes current scientific knowledge. The percentage of such knowledge which makes no appeal to the supernatural is extremely high.

Of course, one hears about specific scientific questions which (allegedly) do not have a plausible naturalistic explanation, such as cosmological fine-tuning, the origin of life, and consciousness. But, even if that is or were true, the history of science contains numerous examples of naturalistic explanations replacing supernatural ones and no examples of the reverse. Indeed, naturalistic explanations have been so successful that even most theists concede that supernatural explanations are, in general, unlikely to be true.

Such explanatory success is just what we would expect on naturalism–which entails that all supernatural explanations are false–than it is on theism.[15] And that’s my second line of evidence against theism.

If we understand 'naturalism' to be dependent on "the kind of entity studied by physicists or chemists", then an example of moving toward other entities can be found in Donald Polkinghorne's 1988 Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences, in which he critiques the choice of academic (theoretical) psychologists to represent human psychology according to "the natural science model". He argues that clinicians (practical) psychologists obtain superior empirical results by breaking out of this straight jacket and "[concerning themselves] with people's stories". The entities studied by physicists and chemists do not appear helpful, here. So have clinical psychologists turned to the 'supernatural'?

Now, neuropharmacology has been tremendously helpful to improving mental health. But one can obtain additional empirical results by employing understandings and techniques which have not been traced back to "the kind of entity studied by physicists or chemists". Indeed, in social sciences the move is further away from such reduction:

    The time seems ripe, even overdue, to announce that there is not going to be an age of paradigm in the social sciences. We contend that the failure to achieve paradigm takeoff is not merely the result of methodological immaturity, but reflects something fundamental about the human world. If we are correct, the crisis of social science concerns the nature of social investigation itself. The conception of the human sciences as somehow necessarily destined to follow the path of the modern investigation of nature is at the root of this crisis. Preoccupation with that ruling expectation is chronic in social science; that idée fixe has often driven investigators away from a serious concern with the human world into the sterility of purely formal argument and debate. As in development theory, one can only wait so long for the takeoff. The cargo-cult view of the "about to arrive science" just won't do. (Interpretive Social Science: A Second Look, 5)

That was written in 1989. Now if this is not actually a turn to the super-natural, then there appears to be equivocation on the term 'natural'. It would appear to refer to both:

     (I) entities studied by physicists and chemists
    (II) aspects of mind current irreducible to (I)

So how can 'naturalism', once we've integrated what works in the social sciences, be used to claim that in fact mind is reducible to what chemists and physicists study? The very attempt to reduce everything to what chemists and physicists study—or more broadly, to do things as they do things—actively stunted the social sciences!

Jeff,

Thank you for your body of work. I am relatively new to this site, so forgive me if these questions have an obvious answer.

1. What are some good resources that posit a non-personal ontological standard of morality?

2. Why are there not any public debates with "informed" presuppositionalists? It seems that all of the debates I have encountered in this category are either with obnoxious presups or with a person who is totally unprepared for their strategy (the Bahnsen debate). What about James N Anderson or Greg Welty? Would they be open to such an exchange? If so I would very much like to see it.

1. See the work of philosopher Erik Wielenberg for a contemporary scholar. See also G.E. Moore and Quentin Smith.
2. I'm not sure how to answer your question. Speaking as both an occasional debater and a former debate organizer, debates are a lot of work. One question to ask is whether there have been any attempts to organize debates between scholars like Anderson or Welty, and an atheist. (I don't know the answer to that question.) I am not qualified to debate presuppositionalism, but it would be interested to see a debate between an informed presuppositionalist and a prepared atheist.

Thanks for the response! I actually used to be a reformed Christian but found the arguments against inerrancy stronger than the arguments for conservative views (among other things). I brought up those scholars because I am familiar (enough) with their work to think there would be more light than heat if they were to engage in such an exchange with a prepared atheist/agnostic. I'm glad you would also be interested to see this, because It seems to me that it would be the next logical step in engaging some of the evolving Christian arguments. I would encourage atheists to take reformed epistemology/presuppositionalism more seriously, not because they think it has intellectual cogency, but because some of those within it are genuinely made to feel crazy (Romans 1) for questioning the tenets of the faith. It can be very cultish.

Jeff,

Thanks for posting this. Much food for thought as always. My take is this: It seems to me that the fundamental difference between theism and naturalism is the choice of ultimate posits. For the naturalist, the most basic and general features of the physical universe are basic; for the theist it is God. How do we determine, in the most absolutely general terms, what kind of thing is most likely to exist? Either (a) we judge by what does exist, or (b) we invoke some purely intrinsic (a priori) standard of probability.

In the former case, we presumably judge the prior probabilities of ultimate posits in terms of their similarity to or continuity with the kinds of things that we recognize as real. In this case, the God hypothesis comes off poorly. The God of theism is conceived as a being of an entirely different sort and possessed of entirely different properties than those of any entities recognize by science. To cite just a few specifics: God exists either timelessly or through infinite time with no beginning or end. God is not constituted of matter or energy and is not part of the space/time universe, yet God is capable of creating and manipulating both matter and energy in the space/time universe. God is not affected by any of the fundamental forces of nature; indeed, God is not subject to any physical law or constraints at all. On the contrary, God, by miraculous intervention, can suspend or annul any physical law and bring about effects that are physically impossible (e.g. thousands fed by a few loaves and fishes). Further, God's powers are supposedly both occult in nature and unlimited in extent. God has the power, in principle occult, of bringing about effects by fiat. God says "Let there be!" and it is. Further, there is no limit to God's powers. All natural powers are of a limited extent. God's omniscience must encompass not just every fact of the actual universe. He must know every true counterfactual, that is, what would be the case in every possible universe. In this sense, God's knowledge would be incomparably vaster and seemingly incomparably more complex than any known store of knowledge. Finally, this infinite mind supposedly has no physical basis at all, unlike every mind known in the natural world. Many more such differences could be cited, but these will suffice.

In the latter case, how do we determine the purely a priori, intrinsic probabilities of ultimate posits, that is, their probabilities in the absence of any empirical information at all? The usual criterion adduced here is simplicity (parsimony, modesty). Here there are two issues (a) Is God a simple hypothesis, and (b) why think that what ultimately exists is more likely to be simpler rather than more complex, e.g. on what basis would we say that a universe consisting of only two protons is more probable than a universe consisting of three protons? Is God a simple hypothesis? Ontological simplicity seems necessarily to involve positing the smallest number of objects of a simple sort. It can hardly count as simple if there are many different types of simple objects (like Leibnizian monads) or if the things postulated are themselves extremely complex. Now monotheism posits just one God, so, so good so far. However, can God be conceived as simple? Theologians have long spoken of the simplicity of God, but prima facie, an omniscient being would have to be infinitely complex. As we say, an omniscient being must know infinitely many things. This knowledge cannot be merely potential, as when, by knowing all the axioms of a formal system, we can potentially prove all the theorems. Rather, for an omniscient being, that knowledge must, in some sense, be complete and actual. Or consider omnipotence, This would actually seem to involve several logically distinct powers. A truly omnipotent being would have to be able to actualize any and every kind of possible reality of every different sort. He must be able to create anything ex nihilo. Further, once created, he must have the power to alter or eliminate those things at will and to any possible extent. These powers seem logically distinct. It is certainly possible to imagine beings that would have the power to do some of these things but not others. Thus, omniscience and omnipotence seem to be complexes of many logically distinct powers, and not simple powers.

Finally, I simply cannot see any reason to think that it is more likely that what exists ultimately is more likely to be one kind of thing than another. ANY (logically) contingent posit will always have infinitely many alternatives, and so infinitely many ways it can be wrong. There are infinitely many ways naturalism can be wrong. There are infinitely many ways that theism can be wrong. How, then, are we to determine the intrinsic probabilities of ultimate posits?

Hi Keith,

With the caveat that we are now way beyond what could reasonably be expected to be covered in a 20-minute opening statement of a public debate, I'm happy to provide some comments which might be helpful. Even better, they might be correct! (That was a joke.)

I'm drawing upon Paul Draper's theory of intrinsic probability as defined and defended in a recent anthology published by Oxford University Press. (I don't have it handy but it was a festschrift in honor of Richard Swinburne.) Draper explicitly acknowledges and critiques Swinburne's criterion of simplicity. He argues that Swinburne's criterion of simplicity is often, but not always, correct. The reasons why have to do with the difference between Swinburne's "simplicity" vs. Draper's "modesty" and "coherence."

While the point of your second paragraph was to show how one might support a low prior probability for theism based upon (a posteriori) background information, some of your same points could actually be reworked to undermine the coherence of theism (where "coherence" means Draper's criterion of coherence, not "coherence" in the usual logical sense). Here is an example:

P: "God is a timeless person who exists and who created physical reality, including (physical) spacetime."

Notice that P is logically equivalent to P1 & P2, where P1 is "God is a timeless person who exists" & P2 is "God created physical reality, including (physical) spacetime." Even if we assume (for the sake of argument) that P is logically coherent, P1 is antecedently improbable conditional upon P2 (and vice versa). This lowers the degree of coherence of P. All else held equal, this lowers the intrinsic probability of P.
Regarding your third paragraph, the kernel of truth in "simplicity" is "modesty." Draper argues pretty convincingly that it is necessarily true that uniformity is intrinsically more probable than variety, and so that supports his theory of intrinsic probability. Everything else held equal, modest claims are intrinsically more probable than immodest claims because the former are "less risky" than the latter. The former make less claims, so there are less ways for them to be false. For example, let X="at least one mind exists" and Y="exactly 3,456 minds exist." Y is logically equivalent to X&Y, so all of the ways to disprove X are also ways to disprove Y. At the same time, there are ways to disprove Y which do not disprove X. For example, if it turns out that there are exactly 3,4555 minds, X is true while Y is false. Because there are more ways for Y to be false than for X to be false, the intrinsic probability of Y is going to be less than the intrinsic probability of X.

Regarding your final paragraph, the answer is to appeal to the cardinality of infinite sets. Using the method I just described in the last paragraph, I think one could show that there is a one-to-one function between the two infinite sets--N (the infinite set of ways to disprove naturalism) and T (the infinite set of ways to disprove theism)--and so the cardinality of N is less than the cardinality of T. Or so it seems to me.

Jeff,

Thanks much, but I remain a skeptic about such appeals to intrinsic probabilities. In the example you give, hypothesis X buys its apparently greater intrinsic probability over Y not by its greater uniformity, but by its lack of specificity. Similarly, your argument to show that naturalism is intrinsically more probable than theism seems to rest upon the claim that naturalism has less content than theism. Naturalism is the claim that some physical universe exists such that, if the mental exists in that universe, then the mental is explained by the physical. Naturalism, so defined, is opposed to supernaturalism, which holds that the mental exists, and if there is a physical universe, then the mental explains the physical. Theism, however, is a specific kind of supernaturalism. It is a particular kind of personal supernaturalism, and, as such is far more specific in its claims than naturalism.

Here I think that the theist would reply that the appropriate contrast is not between the intrinsic probabilities of theism and some physical universe, but between theism and this universe. In fact, this is how Swinburne sets things up in his discussion of the cosmological argument in The Existence of God. Swinburne's argument there is that, where e = The physical universe exists, and h = God exists, p(e/h & k) > p(e/k), that is, that the probability that the universe exists given that God exists is greater than the probability that the universe exists as a brute, uncaused fact. You cannot reply to Swinburne by arguing that some physical universe has greater intrinsic probability than theism. He would rightly respond that, since this one, particular and specific universe does in fact exist, naturalists must hold that it can reasonably be seen as existing as a brute, uncaused fact, i.e. without being created by God. If the contrast is between the intrinsic probabilities of theism and the existence of this universe, then each hypothesis would seem to have equally (infinitely) many ways of being wrong.

With respect to your final paragraph, I am not so sure that an appeal to the cardinality of infinite sets is relevant here. Suppose that there were two lotteries. In one, the winning number is chosen at random from the set of rational numbers, and in the other the number is chosen at random from the set of real numbers. The set of real numbers has a higher cardinality than the set of rational numbers, but is there any reason at all to prefer the lottery drawn from the rational numbers? Either way, the odds are infinitely against you and it would be maximally foolish to take either bet for any finite amount of winnings.

Keith,

Are you skeptical that there is even any such *thing* as intrinsic probabilities? It seems to me that if there are no intrinsic probabilities then there is no objective fact of the matter as to whether any hypothesis is more probable than any other. Subjective bayesians would say that any prior is as valid as any other, but in that case there is nothing epistemically incorrect about me believing that the natural selection is less probable than creationism, or that flat earth theory more probable than round earth theory. No matter how much evidence is presented against these theories, I can also posit a prior low enough to render that evidence insufficient. So if there are objective facts about posteriors, there must be objective facts about priors. And as the saying goes "today's posterior was yesterday's prior" so ultimately objective priors must rest on objective intrinsic probabilities, or else all probability judgement are subjective in the end. I think Swinburne and Draper are correct when they say there are an infinite number of theories that fit the data perfectly well, so we need to ultimately differentiate between the emprically adequate theories on the basis of nonempirical intrinsic priors.

Ron,

No, in general I am not at all skeptical of prior probabilities in the sense of probability with respect to background knowledge, p(h/k). My skepticism comes in when there is no (non-tautological) background knowledge, when, in effect we are just asking the value of p(h) in absolutely general, unrestricted terms, i.e. given, really, nothing at all. This is precisely the situation we are in when we are talking about ultimate posits. What, given no background knowledge at all, is the probability that at least one mind will exist? I see no way to give any sort of reasonable or plausible answer to this question. Indeed, I am not even sure that it makes any sense to ask it. If h = "at least one mind exists," then I see no basis at all for assigning any probability, high or low, to p(h). If "There exists at least one mind" did have a probability, then I would say that "There are exactly 3546 minds," as Jeff says, would be lower. But if p(h) has no value at all, high or low, then it cannot be compared to the probability of any other hypotheses. I suspect that here we are in precisely the situation where our thinking becomes dialectical in Kant's sense. That is, concepts like probability, that have clear meaning in empirical contexts, have no meaning at all when we leave behind any possible empirical context, and we fly off to Cloud-Cuckoo-Land. The upshot, as I see it, is that when we are talking about ultimate posits--whether God, the universe, or anything--we have no basis for assigning any prior probabilities at all. Whatever exists as the ultimate brute fact is neither probable nor improbable. It just is. This is why I am equally skeptical of attempts to say that theism or naturalism is intrinsically more probable.

I think what you’re saying is that the prior probability of ultimate posits is inscrutable. You may be right about this, but nonetheless I’ve seen arguments for Naturalism and for Theism that presuppose the two hypotheses start off with equal probabilities. I take it this is because both sides of the debate consider this to be the fairest starting point. However, given the way Naturalism is defined in this blog post this may no longer be the case since the claims made by the two hypotheses are not symmetrical. Because Naturalism and Supernaturalism are symmetrical claims the fairest starting point seems to be to consider their probabilities as equal.

Istvan,

I think your comments are on the money. I am indeed saying that the probability of ultimate posits is inscrutable. When you have prescinded from all possible empirical (nontautological) information, I see no reasonable basis for assigning objective a priori probabilities to any posit. For any h whatsoever, what is p(h), considered with respect to absolutely no background information at all? Any answer you give would seem arbitrary, or, I think, simply meaningless. With apologies to Jeff Lowder and Paul Draper, I think that efforts by naturalists here are just as much murky metaphysics as those by Swinburne et al. I think that in such circumstances, our thinking has become dialectical in Kant's sense and that we are trying to employ the concept of probability out of any context that would give it meaning.

Of course, we do have the probability calculus, which, though it originated with Pascal to account for the very this-world application of gambling odds, was formalized axiomatically by Andrey Kolomogorov. Yet it is one thing to have a formal system, and another entirely to determine its application within certain domains. The application of probability calculations to ultimate posits cannot simply be read off from the axioms. Their applicability in that context is an important philosophical question. It may well be that the axioms of the probability calculus require that p(h1 & h2) < p(h1), but if p( h1) is meaningless (as, I claim it is with ultimate posits), then the conclusion is that probability calculations just have no application here.

If, on the other hand, debates between naturalists and theists have to have SOME absolutely primitive values for the probabilities of a natural universe and for God, then, as you note, it seems that these could be assigned by pragmatic or methodological means. They could be negotiated or recognized as to some extent subjective. There is no reason to try to base them on baseless claims about what must ultimately exist.

Keith,

Thanks for the response! I’m curious how we can make sense of the conditional probability P(h|k) if we think that the absolute probability P(h) is meaningless, because P(h|k)=P(h)xP(k|h)/P(k). So doesn’t affirming a value for P(h|k) commit you to affirming that P(h) has some value as well?

You may suggest that P(h) can be estimated by conditioning h on some more fundamental, non-tautological empirical background knowledge k*, so P(h) is just shorthand for P(h|k*). But to quote the philosopher Michael Huemer,

“By invoking further empirical inferences, they merely take the first step in a regress that the empiricist cannot complete. These further inferences will be subject to the same problem as the original inference: every empirical inference depends for its cogency on a suitable initial probability distribution. When e and h are logically independent (neither entails or contradicts the other), it is always true that a sufficiently low prior probability for h will leave h highly improbable in the light of e, and it is always true that there are coherent probability distributions on which e fails to raise the probability of h. So we would always need an independent justification for ruling out such probability distributions. Since we cannot have an infinite series of empirical reasons, the problem of the priors cannot in general be solved by empirical reasoning.” https://philpapers.org/arch...

I highly recommend Huemer’s paper. I think Jeff would really enjoy it too.

Ron,

Sorry, I am not ignoring you. I have been busy with my lengthy reply to Jacobus Erasmus posted above.

I was afraid when I did not hear back from you or Jeff right away that you thought I was being flippant or obtuse in saying that I am skeptical of giving prior probabilities to ultimate posits. I could cite a number of recognized philosophers who share that skepticism, so I was not just trying to be a pain in the ass.

I will get back to you on this, but it may be a few days.

Keith, re: your first paragraph: you are correct on uniformity vs. specificity. I mixed those up.

Regarding your first and second paragraphs, you're confusing "some physical universe" with "the physical." Naturalism, a/k/a source physicalism, doesn't claim that any one physical universe is causally fundamental. Similarly, naturalism, a/k/a source physicalism, doesn't claim that some set of physical particles is causally fundamental. Naturalism simply claims that the physical, whatever that turns out to be at bottom, has ontological priority. If a theist, such as Swinburne, were to reply as you suggest, "that the appropriate contrast is not between the intrinsic probabilities of theism and some physical universe, but between theism and this universe," I would in turn reply that the theist is rigging the contrast against the naturalist. Unlike Swinburne's contrast, the contrast between naturalism and supernaturalism is non-partisan and fair to both sides.

Regarding your last paragraph, I don't understand how your thought experiment is analogous to what I wrote. In your original post, you seemed to say that there are as many ways for naturalism to be wrong as there are ways for theism to be wrong. I don't agree with this and I provided an answer regarding countably infinite sets. In your thought experiment, the odds are infinitely against you that you would select the winning number. In contrast, the intrinsic probabilities of naturalism and supernaturalism are not infinitesimal. Naturalism, supernaturalism, and otherism form a mutually exclusive, jointly exhaustive set. Furthermore, naturalism and supernaturalism seem to be intrinsically more probable than otherism. So what possible reason is there to suggest that supernaturalism and naturalism have infinitesimal intrinsic probabilities analogous to your winning number analogy? So far as I can see, none whatsoever.

Jeff,

See my reply to Ron above. That gets to the heart of my qualms with this approach to defending naturalism.

I must say, though, that "source physicalism" just sounds like murky metaphysics to me. "Naturalism simply claims that the physical, whatever that turns out to be at bottom, has ontological priority" seems to me to say close to nothing. It seems to assume that there is some general, rich, and robust sense of "physical" of which our particular current coneptualization of the physical is just one instance. On the contrary, our one and only paradigm of "the physical" is the physical universe as we presently understand it. Therefore, any conception we have of "the physical" will have to be an abstraction from or generalization of our current best theories. A hypothesis positing some such vague, general, "physical" as an ultimate posit will, once again, gain an appearance of probability due to its lack of content. I think a theist could then charge that the naturalist is rigging the debate by taking refuge in vagueness.

My point in the thought experiment was just that when the sample spaces are infinite sets, the cardinality of the sets seems to have no bearing on any sort of betting strategy. When the odds are infinity to one, the expected winnings from a jackpot of any finite size will be zero. Further, it seems to me a necessary truth that any logically contingent ultimate posit there will be infinitely many logically possible alternatives that might (possibly) have existed instead. There are infinitely many possible worlds. If the ultimate reality turns out to be physical, then it will be some particular kind of thing, even if we do not presently know just what kind of thing it will be. Whatever it is, there will be infinitely many other realities that "could" have been. Therefore I just do not see any reason to think that it--whatever it is-will be intrinsically more probable than theism.

Hi Keith,

1. For the very reason given by Ron earlier, it seems to me that it would be very difficult to deny that applying Bayes' Theorem to propositions presupposes that propositions have intrinsic probabilities. I'm not sure if you're willing to grant that or not, but this point may not matter if your objection is correct.

2. I understand your objection ("the probability of ultimate posits is inscrutable"). This reminds me of a similar point I think you made in your dissertation for your (first) Ph.D. At the same time, I'm struggling to find a supporting argument for your objection. The following seems to represent your reasoning:

When you have prescinded from all possible empirical (nontautological) information, I see no reasonable basis for assigning objective a priori probabilities to any posit. For any h whatsoever, what is p(h), considered with respect to absolutely no background information at all? Any answer you give would seem arbitrary, or, I think, simply meaningless.

On the contrary, if you accept that propositions have intrinsic probabilities, then their intrinsic probabilities would have to be somehow determined solely by a proposition's content. What attributes or properties of a proposition's content would be relevant to a proposition's intrinsic probability? The list of candidates is very small: modesty, coherence, and simplicity. Swinburne has defended simplicity, but Draper in an OUP festschrift in honor of Swinburne has argued persuasively that simplicity needs to be replaced by coherence and modesty. Not only does it seem intuitivey plausible that coherence and modesty are relevant to intrinsic probability, but it's far from obvious what else could be relevant. Regardless, I encourage you to take a look at the anthology and consider his arguments.

3. It seems like other critics (and perhaps you?) don't like attaching the label of "naturalism" or "source physicalism" to the proposition those labels represent. Fine, but notice that my definitions were (and are) stipulative, so my definitions cannot be incorrect. Of course, my definition of "source physicalism" could be "murky metaphysics," but that's just name-calling. It's also misleading bordering on being flat out false. As I define it, the concept of "source physicalism" doesn't commit the naturalist to all that much, i.e., it is compatible with a variety of views about the mind-body problem.

4. Yes, I agree with you that there are infinitely many possible worlds involving different configurations of physical stuff. But, again, source physicalism (as I've defined it), isn't committed to any particular configuration of physical stuff. But that isn't relevant to the probability that some kind of physical reality exists.

Dear Mr. Lowder

I have some problems with your definitions of 'naturalism' as well as 'suernaturalism'

1. I have the intuition that naturalism, as well as supernaturalism, if true, should be necessarily true and not just contingently true.
You stated, that the debate between you and Dr.Turek was about "what best explains reality".
But if, say naturalism is true, but only happens to be true without being necessarily true, i think it lacks explanatory value.
Perhaps, naturalism could be better defined as a delimiter of possibilities without the dependency on a contingent state of affairs (the existence of matter)

2. You define naturalism the following way: "First, by “naturalism,” I mean the view that the physical exists and, if the mental exists,
the physical explains why the mental exists."
And you define supernaturalism as: "The view that the mental exists and, if the physical exists, the mental explains why anything physical exists."

Here i think the definitions you use may be unclear: I guess by "if" you mean "in any case" since otherwise there may be the weird case of
supernaturalism being true at one point, and at a later point naturalism being true.
Why? Because it may be possible for the mental to exist, without the physical explaining why it exists, so that supernaturalism is true. But then
the mental, unexplained by the physical, could cease to exist while the physical may begin to exist and with it the mental, explained by the physical.
For example, a non-physical mind may exist all alone, stop to exist, then physical matter starts to exist, forming a physical brain and therefor 'the mental explained by the physical'.
But if you define naturalism as: "The view that the physical exists and, in any case the mental exists, the physical explains why the mental exists." you
avoid the problem.

Am i just wrong ?

The "If" is really stating a material conditional of sorts, so really Lowder means "If the mental exists, THEN the physical explains why the mental exists". As a result, Lowder is stating "In any case...".

Thx for clarifying that.

In case anyone is interested in reading more about the intrinsic probability of Theism and Atheism and has the required access (unfortunately I don’t) here are a couple of publications I came across:
Paul Draper’s paper “Simplicity and Natural Theology”, where he writes about the criterion of coherence, in Reason and Faith: Themes from Richard Swinburne.
http://www.oxfordscholarshi...
Calum Miller’s paper “The intrinsic probability of theism”. It’s quite a recent publication in Philosophy Compass journal.
https://onlinelibrary.wiley...

There’s also a blog post over at Apologetics in the Church critiquing Draper’s “God and the Burden of Proof”.
http://www.apologeticsinthe...
I hope you will find those links useful.

Problems with your definition:

First, by “naturalism,” I mean the view that the physical exists and, if the mental exists, the physical explains why the mental exists.[1] If naturalism is true, then there are no purely mental beings which can exist apart from a physical body and so there is no God or any person or being much like God. Second, by “supernaturalism,” I mean the view that the mental exists and, if the physical exists, the mental explains why anything physical exists.[2] If supernaturalism is true, then there is no purely physical matter which can exist without some sort of ultimate mental creator.

This asserts that God is a being one among many, ("...no purely mental beings"). The theological trajectory developed by Tillich, John Macquarrie, (and others) voiced at Vatican II, indicates God is not a being but being itself. Moreover we have a problem in understanding what "mental" is when divorced from the physical process involving brain. I guess I don't mind your definition in principle but it is kind a metaphysical constrict to assert that we can see into the black box deeply enough to know that God's mental process well enough to critique it. I just assume that is part of what is meant by "God transcends our understanding."

If I were to say the physical is only a form of energy and matter is not the primary state or the primordial state of energy, you would probably say I am being too literal about the physical. It's not matter per se that makes something physical, such that energy is a from of the physical. I assume you might say something like that? I say we don't know all forms of energy. We don't know all that is involved in reality. Thus since the mental is a form of energy how do you know all physical doesn't reduce to the mental? Why make this sharp distinction between physical physical and mental especially when dealing with the ultimate ends of existence?

It would be enormously helpful to me (and probably many others) if you could produce something written by an analytic philosopher (who specializes in philosophical theology) which clarifies what it means to say that "God is being itself." I think (?) I know what you mean, but I am not sure about that and so I don't want to waste my time arguing over something which could be based on a simple misunderstanding (on my part, not yours). I'm specifically suggesting an analytic philosopher, not a continental philosopher or a theologian, because I find the former to be far more (conceptually) clear than the latter.

Apart from the Being itself thing I wish you would address what I said about energy
ie:

We don't know all that is involved in reality. Thus since the mental is a form of energy how do you know all physical doesn't reduce to the mental? Why make this sharp distinction between physical physical and mental especially when dealing with the ultimate ends of existence?

Sorry, Joe. With all due respect, I have no idea what you are talking about.

Don't worry about it man, No one else does why should you? Look you say SN = physical depends upon the mental. right? You say N = mental depends upon the physical. My question is assuming that I can assert rationally that mind is a form of energy (I can't think what else it would be), since we know that matter is just another form of energy how do we know that the N and SN don't meet at some point where they are both energy?

If mind is a form of energy, then "naturalism" as I have defined it, a/k/a "source physicalism," is true. In fact, in that case, I think eliminative materialism might even be true. Welcome back to atheism, Joe! 😂🤗

I suppose you are assuming there's only one kind of energy and we know all about it? I don't think we actually know what energy is. For example what is it made of? Most scientists will say charges but charges are comes out to be more charges. If Mind is energy it could as easily be that your view reduces to a form of idealism.;-)

http://metacrock.blogspot.c...

With the caveat that I'm not a physicist, I'm going to stipulate that anything "physical" has a spatial location. So, when you ask, "what if minds are a form of energy?", my reply is, "Do minds, on your view, have a spatial location?" If yes, then they're what I would call "physical." If no, then they're an example of what I would call something "mental" existing without something "physical" supporting or causing it.

"Do minds, on your view, have a spatial location?" If yes, then they're what I would call "physical." If no, then they're an example of what I would call something "mental" existing without something "physical" supporting or causing it.

Good point but unfortunately it makes the same fallacy as the solidity argument. Look, take a solid object it seems clearly physical. At the subatomic level,however, its mostly nothing. Go down to the level of the particles that make up the object, they are not little balls. In order to explain what they are we have to enter into a recursion and pretend it's not not recursive. Solidity is an illusion.

In the same way location is an illusion as well for the same reason, places are just points amid objects and space. Everything is mostly space and objectives are not really that solid,so places are not where they seem. Now the mental aspect of our lives is highly dependent upon physical apparatus. But since that is illusory it's more parsimonious to assume that the whole rests upon some basic formation that not dependent or illusory.

Just because life that emerges within the complicity of physical depends upon the illusion of solidity for the production of the mental doesn't mean that the ultimate foundation of reality would be as well, That would not be physical since that is illusory. Nor would it be dependent upon the physical, it would have to be some third thing we don't understand.

As for cation if we assume,for the sake of argument,that a universal mind produced all of reality where would the mind be located? It would not be in it;s owns thoughts except as an object reason.

Hi Joe, I can't make sense of your position. I can't figure out if your position is a form of source naturalism, source idealism, or otherism. I'm leaning in favor of calling your position a type of otherism, but I'm not sure.

why is it so important to label my ideas? You speak as though the meaning is in the label. I have thought about calling it a from of pan psychism, I see God as universal mind and all of God's creation as a thought in that mind,

The label isn't important. Figuring out the probability space of your ideas is.

Too many variables, and hidden variables.

The problem is the kind of person who is into analytical is usually moving away from the kind of thinking that goes into existentialist types of philosophy. It's like saying find me a feminist who is right to life. I/m sure they can be found but since I am not drawn to analytical I haven't looked, A lot of analytical types don;t like Tillich. One of my favorite processors, William Abraham who was an Oxford trained positivist hates Tillich.

Weiman might qualify but not sure

https://kinginstitute.stanf...

https://kinginstitute.stanf...

I don’t know if you’re aware of this but Jacobus Erasmus over at Free Thinking Ministries critiqued the case for Naturalism you made during your debate with Turek in a two part analysis. This was back in 2017. The relevant links are at the end of this comment.
The part I found most interesting is about your claim that Naturalism is intrinsically more probable than Theism. Basically there are two types of modesty: linguistic and ontological. The former is about the number of claims a hypothesis asserts, while the latter is about the number of entities a hypothesis asserts (a hypothesis is more modest than another if the former asserts the existence of fewer entities - objects, events, properties - than the latter). Linguistic modesty seems to allow „one to rig the process of inference to the best explanation”. More to the point linguistic modesty allows us to „define our hypotheses such that they make as many assertions as we want, and then we can choose as the most modest the hypothesis that makes the least number of claims”. This means the theist can say that Theism asserts only that “God exists”, while holding that Naturalism asserts several things - thus making Theism more modest than Naturalism.
I would like to know what you think about the above criticism.

http://freethinkingministri...
http://freethinkingministri...

Here's another example of where I think Erasmus is being quite uncharitable. He writes: "Indeed, it seems to me that theism wins here. Since naturalism is the view that physical reality is all that exists, most versions of naturalism affirm that physical reality is eternal in that either (i) there exists one universe that has existed for an infinite number of events, or (ii) there exists a multiverse that comprises an infinite number of universes. Either way, this version of naturalism asserts the existence of an infinite number of events or universes."

This is doubly uncharitable. First, he's attempting to measure the intrinsic probability of one hypothesis, naturalism, by measuring the intrinsic probability of that hypothesis conjoined with an auxiliary hypothesis--his (i) or (ii). But that's an apples to apples-plus-oranges comparison. Second, despite what he writes, his claim isn't about intrinsic probability at all. Look at how I defined "intrinsic probability" in my speech:

By “intrinsic probability” of a hypothesis, I mean the probability independent of the evidence we have for or against it. The intrinsic probability of a hypothesis is determined entirely by its modesty and coherence.

To which I could have added (but did not, due to speaking time constraints), that the intrinsic probability of a hypothesis is determined solely by its content. This means a posteriori information is irrelevant to intrinsic probability.

Why is this a problem for Erasmus? Naturalism, as I've defined it, isn't committed to either (i) or (ii). If a naturalist subscribes to either (i) or (ii), then that would be the result of some factor which is extrinsic to the content of naturalism. For example, a scientist, who could be a theist or a naturalist, might posit a multiverse in order to explain such puzzling phenomena as the so-called "cold spot" (see here and here). But, if they do, they're appealing to a posteriori information which is by definition irrelevant to intrinsic probability. More important, naturalism doesn't entail that infinite past events, as posited by (i), or infinite universes, as posited by (ii), are causally fundamental. As I have defined it, naturalism is merely the view that the physical exists and, if the mental exists, the physical explains why the mental exists. It follows from this definition that, on naturalism, the physical world existed before the mental world and caused the mental world to come into existence. Naturalism says nothing about the physical world including an infinite number of past events. On naturalism, therefore, even if there were an infinite number of past events, the "infinite number of past events" would not be causally fundamental, i.e., the infinite number of past events would play no causal role in naturalism's claim that the mental world is dependent on the physical world.

Likewise, naturalism says nothing about the physical world having an infinite number of parallel universes which make a multiverse. On naturalism, therefore, even if there were an infinite number of universes, the multiverse would not be causally fundamental, i.e,, the multiverse isn't essential to naturalism's requirement that the mental world is dependent on the physical world.

Finally, it's worth pointing out that while I do not subscribe to Erasmus's (i) or (ii), they are both logically compatible with theism. Showing the compatibility of theism and (i) is a little tricky, but it just requires defining "priority" as "causal priority" and not "temporal priority." As for (ii), not only are theism and the multiverse logically compatible, but some theists appeal to multiverse theodicies to defend against arguments from evil.

Thank you very much for the clarifications and for taking the time to write such a long comment. I really appreciate it. I’m also glad you brought up the issue of auxiliary hypotheses, because back when you debated Vandergriff the issue of whether or not the Hypothesis of Indifference (HI) is entailed by Naturalism (as you define it) or if it should be considered an auxiliary hypothesis came up. You claimed that it’s entailed by Naturalism and one of Vandergriff’s objections was that HI is too immodest to be entailed by it. I know you hold that HI has a greater intrinsic probability than supernaturalism or naturalism, but I don’t understand why. In one of your comments you said it’s because ”it has no positive ontological commitments”. Could you please expand on that?

In my debate with Kevin Vandergriff, I invited the audience to consider a Venn diagram representing the probability spaces for naturalism (N) and the hypothesis of indifference (HI). I said that the circle for N is completely inside the circle for HI. Why? HI is defined as "Neither the nature nor the condition of sentient beings on earth is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by nonhuman persons." It doesn't actually claim that anything exists; what it does claim is that IF there is an Earth with sentient beings, THEN neither the nature nor the condition of those sentient beings is the result of benevolent or malevolent actions performed by nonhuman persons. So, HI is compatible with:

- Earth & sentient beings & nonhuman (unembodied) persons
- Earth & sentient beings & nonhuman embodied persons
- Earth & no sentient beings
- No earth
- No physical reality (and so no universe) & no mental reality (and so no unembodied persons like gods, angels, ghosts, etc.).

Because HI makes no positive ontological claims, i.e., it does not claim anything exists, it is more modest than N, which claims that a physical reality exists.

Thank you for answering my question. I see now that the modesty of a hypothesis is not evaluated by simply counting the number of claims the hypothesis makes. Those claims mustn’t be seen from a linguistic standpoint, but from an ontological one. They can contain positive or negative ontological commitments or no ontological commitments at all and based on the case we figure out the probability space for that hypothesis and evaluate its modesty. This means that a hypothesis asserting only that God exists is not going to be more modest than Naturalism (as you define it) because (using Venn diagrams) the circle for the former hypothesis is inside the circle for Supernaturalism and the circle for Naturalism is as big as the circle for Supernaturalism. As for the various assertions Erasmus said in his blog post that Naturalism makes (such as the negative ontological commitments: Christianity is false and Islam is false and God does not exist), they have nothing to do with the way you define Naturalism. It’s just a different definition. Under your definition the claims I exemplified are entailed since the circle for Naturalism doesn’t overlap with the circle for Supernaturalism.
Am I getting this right?

I took another look at Erasmus’ blog post where he claims that background knowledge should also be considered when evaluating the intrinsic probability of a hypothesis because if we don’t we end up with “many absurd hypotheses being more intrinsically probable than plausible hypotheses”. He lists three hypotheses that he says are more intrinsically probable than Naturalism, but I don’t think he’s right about them.
First, the hypothesis that “Nothing exists” has been discussed in the comments thread from one of your posts, “Potential Objections to Swinburne’s Cosmological Argument”. The basic idea being that the hypothesis cannot even be entertained if there isn’t someone to entertain it. I understand this to mean that its intrinsic probability is 0.
Second, the hypothesis that “Only you exist and the external world is a figment of your imagination” may refer to either a natural being or a supernatural one. If it’s a natural being it is in the circle for Naturalism and thus has a lower intrinsic probability than Naturalism. If it’s a supernatural being it is in the circle for Supernaturalism and thus has a lower intrinsic probability than Supernaturalism, and implicitly a lower intrinsic probability than Naturalism.
Third, the hypothesis that “God alone exists (and thus no physical reality exists)” also has a lower intrinsic probability than Naturalism since God is a supernatural being.

Yes, I think your first paragraph is right.

Regarding your second paragraph, I would make the point in a slightly different way. The motivation for having a theory of intrinsic probability in the first place is to have a way to deal with prior probability in cases where there is no relevant background knowledge. As "ultimate" metaphysical hypotheses, it is problematic to identify relevant background knowledge to use for assessing a prior probability. Richard Swinburne, for example, says that there there is no relevant background knowledge to be used for assessing the prior probability of theism; all we have is tautological and a priori knowledge. In contrast, "background information" is usually understood to mean "a posteriori information." So, if there is no relevant (a posteriori) background information for ultimate hypotheses like theism and naturalism, then it makes sense to use intrinsic probability. Regarding "absurd hypotheses being more intrinsically probable than non-absurd hypotheses," Erasmus may have confused intrinsic probability and final probability. Even if it were the case that some absurd hypotheses have a higher intrinsic probability than non-absurd hypotheses, it doesn't follow that the absurd hypotheses have a higher FINAL probability than the non-absurd hypotheses. You can think of final probability as a function of intrinsic probability, prior probability (a posteriori background information), and explanatory power. The reason we consider some hypotheses, such as "God alone exists (and thus no physical reality exists", to be absurd is not because of their intrinsic probability, but because of our extrinsic reasons for thinking the absurd hypotheses are false.

All right. Thank you.

I'm flattered he found the opening statement worthy of a detailed reply. It will come as no surprise to anyone that I disagree with him on virtually every point, but more important is the fact that I don't consider his point about "linguistic modesty" to be an accurate or even charitable representation of my argument. In fact, my points about coherence and modesty show that naturalism (as I have defined it) and supernaturalism (as I have defined it), are equally ontologically modest, whereas theism (as I have defined it) is ontologically less modest than naturalism. I think he's barking up the wrong tree. If I were trying to defend theism (or Christian theism) against my opening statement, I would concede the first contention (from my opening statement), but try to minimize the impact of the point about intrinsic probability by arguing that theism is not significantly less intrinsically probable than supernaturalism and/or argue that the evidence favoring theism over naturalism "swamps" its intrinsic improbability.

I understand what you mean, but I also see that you and Erasmus use ontological modesty to reach very different conclusions. I say this because in the second part of his assessment of your case for Naturalism he focuses (among other things) on the impact ontological modesty has on the hypotheses of Naturalism and Theism. He thinks that as long as Naturalism asserts the existence of an infinite number of entities (e.g. events or universes) and Theism asserts the existence a finite number of entities (e.g. God and a finite number of events) it follows that Theism is more modest than Naturalism.

I stand by what I wrote: I don't think Erasmus has accurately or even charitably represented my view. Here is one of many examples. He writes: "Since naturalism is the view that physical reality is all that exists..." Except that is precisely NOT how I defined naturalism in my opening statement. I understand that many naturalists do define naturalism in that way, which is why I spent precious speaking time in my opening statement to offer nuanced definitions of my terms. And in every speech after my opening statement I made it very clear that I was NOT defending the view that physical reality is all that exists.

I will leave it as an exercise for the reader to determine why Erasmus has failed to show that theism is more modest than naturalism.

He thinks that as long as Naturalism asserts the existence of an infinite number of entities (e.g. events or universes) and Theism asserts the existence a finite number of entities (e.g. God and a finite number of events) it follows that Theism is more modest than Naturalism.

I don't think that follows.

For instance, consider the following two scenarios:
1) A universe containing 42 particles, all of the same type.
2) A universe containing 42 particles, all of different types.

It seems obvious to me that (1) is by far a more modest ontological commitment than (2). This despite how they have the same number of entities.

I assume this is what you referred to as "linguistic" modesty, but I fail to see how it is not also a form of ontological commitment.

Do you disagree?

I think the concept of “linguistic modesty” that Erasmus uses is based on a misunderstanding of what Jeffery Jay Lowder means by modesty. His comments on this thread have shown that.

Thanks, Bogdan. While Erasmus has no obligation to contact me before writing a critique, I wish he had done so. I think I could have cleared up several points, which would have enabled him to produce a better critique.

Hey Jeff, great to see you posting again,even if it is a repeat. You present a very interesting position. I hope you will post Dr. Turek's responses in full not just as points that you answer in your speeches. I must continue my standard complaint about the poplar understanding of SN which you reflect in your arguments. '

Second, by “supernaturalism,” I mean the view that the mental exists and, if the physical exists, the mental explains why anything physical exists.[2] If supernaturalism is true, then there is no purely physical matter which can exist without some sort of ultimate mental creator.

You reduce the SN to building material.

Hi Joe, thanks. I don’t have transcripts of his speeches or my other speeches, so this will be my only posted speech from that debate. Sorry.

O well. do you have a link to his speeches where were they posted? btw

By “intrinsic probability” of a hypothesis, I mean the probability independent of the evidence we have for or against it. The intrinsic probability of a hypothesis is determined entirely by its modesty and coherence.[6]

I am dubious of that principle> i have to be careful there because it may turn out my God arguments rely totally upon such a principle, I think it reacquires a good deal of specificity in administering such an argument. I doubt we understand the variables clearly enough to make the argument you are making.

By “accuracy” of a hypothesis, I mean the degree to which a hypothesis’s predictions correspond to reality. We measure accuracy by looking at “evidence.”

Yet your major principle is works apart from evidence, And speaking of evidence that's where the problem of knowledge comes in again. We don't understand enough about the variables.

It seems you are constructing a metaphysical system.