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<rss version="2.0"><channel><title>Disqus - Latest Comments for John G. Denham</title><link>http://disqus.com/people/b6d76f93aa0b200462766c710c6a2552/</link><description></description><language>en</language><lastBuildDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2008 10:37:01 -0000</lastBuildDate><item><title>Re: San Francisco Bay Bridge Damage Survey -&amp;nbsp;Video</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/san_francisco_bay_bridge_damage_survey_nbspvideo/#comment-1342658</link><description>As time passes we get more insight. The CAUSE is now evident and the WHY are clear. No functioning BOTM and failure to follow properr command and conning procedures by the pilot. Pre-departure breifing IAW 33CFR 164.11 was promulgated into regulations to prevent this. John G. Denham,  Maritime Research</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 27 Nov 2007 10:33:19 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: The Most Dangerous Hour In&amp;nbsp;Shipping</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/the_most_dangerous_hour_innbspshipping/#comment-1344464</link><description>The article incorrectly implies ALL ships at sea are as described whereas many ships (cruise , MM&amp;amp;P manned vessel)  frequently have licensed masters as 3rd mates. My experience was that all watch changing times were most  exposed to distractions, confusion and misunderstanding. Always of concern was the evening meal relief.</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 12 Dec 2007 11:15:15 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: The Most Dangerous Hour In&amp;nbsp;Shipping</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/the_most_dangerous_hour_innbspshipping/#comment-1344457</link><description>Regarding your article on BRM. See: Naval Institute Proceeding September 1994 pages 111-114.ORGANIZING AND MANAGING THE BRIDGE TEAM. The most important word is organizing. It doesn't just happen. In APL it cost over $1,00,000 in training to convince many experienced , senior captains  the bridge watch personnel were not individuals but teams, licensed, unlicensed and pilots. Few ships unmoor with the same people on the bridge as during the transit to or from sea. The article was written  after implemenation at APL.  The US Navy has a system of assigning duties to persons on the bridge for combat but few recognize the risk in day today navigation. See:" Why Didn't I Slow down." Naval Institue Proceeding January 1966 Page 79-81</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 12 Dec 2007 12:02:08 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Independent Panel Releases Report on Cosco&amp;nbsp;Busan</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/independent_panel_releases_report_on_cosconbspbusan/#comment-1347800</link><description>My perusal of the summary disclosed several inconsistancies in the BREIF TIMELINE OF EVENTS. From events 0820 through 0829 does not appear navigationally feasible. If this is a pre-cursor of the ISPR expertness, we will never know why the COSCO BUSAN allided with the fender on D tower. My chart analysis  using reported speed  and stated facts produce different situations  than can have actually happened. I feel the statements maybe true but are not sequentlualy correct.</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 01 Feb 2008 12:31:33 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Independent Panel Releases Report on Cosco&amp;nbsp;Busan</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/independent_panel_releases_report_on_cosconbspbusan/#comment-1347801</link><description>The present ISPR report as I understand is part1  of 2 reports. I found the brief timeline in the introduction-summary to be inconsistant with the animation and navigational data. With the  0827- 0831 animation I found further conflicts with the probable scenario.</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 04 Feb 2008 09:59:21 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Independent Panel Releases Report on Cosco&amp;nbsp;Busan</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/independent_panel_releases_report_on_cosconbspbusan/#comment-1347803</link><description>The present ISPR report as I understand is part1  of 2 reports. I found the brief timeline in the introduction-summary to be inconsistant with the animation and navigational data. With the  0827- 0831 animation I found further conflicts with the probable scenario.</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Mon, 04 Feb 2008 09:59:21 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Artificial Intelligence - Can VTS be far behind? | gCaptain.com</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/artificial_intelligence_can_vts_be_far_behind_gcaptaincom/#comment-1348156</link><description>VTS management has been in the learning process  since its inception because it lacks "expertise and local knowledge."  Most pilots consider the " VTS kids" lacking in experience. Simple solution: Every active pilot should do a shift as VTS Advisor and be authorized to communicate directly with any vessel if there is any doubt as to its actions. With 60 pilots on the rolls there is no unreasonable hardship and the expertise and local knowledge is contantly available. The pilots can afford it and use the experience. VTS is part of the ordinary practice of seaman, and no one is too old to learn. Being part of the solution is better than being guardians of the bay.</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 12 Feb 2008 09:18:25 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Signal Flags | gCaptain.com</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/signal_flags_gcaptaincom/#comment-1348104</link><description>John: In days of old in the U.S. Navy there was a dreaded signal  "Bravo Zulu, tack Negat D6. Meaning "WELL DONE EXCEPT DESTROYER NUMBER 6. " Often hoised from the flagship when a destoyer failed in a tactical maneuver. "</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 12 Feb 2008 09:25:56 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Sea Stories - Training At&amp;nbsp;Sea</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/sea_stories_training_atnbspsea/#comment-1348302</link><description>John. I am surprised on the Piney Point program. I get the monthly newletter and it is full of graduation stuff. However while at APL as Ass't Marine Supt a C10 skipper said his CMA 3rd mate did not know how to steer.</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 16 Feb 2008 01:43:00 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: US Mariner Licensing Consultants | gCaptain.com</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/us_mariner_licensing_consultants_gcaptaincom/#comment-1348418</link><description>I do feel sorry for presnet license candidates that missed the opportunity to sit and discuss written answers with license examiner, not too many years ago. From 2nd mate to Master I sat and watched my responses being graded by a person that knew and understood what I wrote and instantly recognized if I was right or wrong, or he misunderstood ( possible). In New York (Chief Mate with U.S. Lines) the examiners asked me, "Did Captain Horka teach you this?"  "Yes, sir, " I replied. "Uhmm, then it must be right." Too bad you missed those days.</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 17 Feb 2008 14:29:04 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: A Word On Vessel Traffic Service | gCaptain.com</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/a_word_on_vessel_traffic_service_gcaptaincom/#comment-1348482</link><description>A duty pilot advisor can talk with a pilot and exchange information, and, can informVTS staff of pertinent information  that may be applicable. However without a joint cooperative effort that is mutually agreed to the status quo continues.  Lawful  terms "by all available means" and "special circumstances." may be applied. JGD</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 20 Feb 2008 10:08:03 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Perfectly Dangerous - A Waterspout At&amp;nbsp;Sea</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/perfectly_dangerous_a_waterspout_atnbspsea/#comment-1348501</link><description>As an Ensign USNR Merchant Marine Naval Reserve  my first USS was the Allagash AO97 in the Atlantic. Tthe skipper was a medalled WW11 officer of exceptional experience. In 1940 in command of a 4 piper destroyer in Panama he was tasked  to penetrate a water spout and report the results. The destoyer was buttoned-up for battle except a single port in the 6 by 6 foot chartroom. The old destoyer barely survived having lost a motor whaleboat and all topside canvas , but more surprising,  every chart in the  four drawer chart desk with over a  thousnad charts were sucked out through the 8 inch port. JGD</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 20 Feb 2008 17:11:14 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: The Anatomy of Allisions | gCaptain.com</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/the_anatomy_of_allisions_gcaptaincom/#comment-1348575</link><description>In my pulished blog on tugs and bridges  a graphic did not come through. What was portrayed is the assumed make up of the two tugs and the barge (tandem)  to comprise  a 628 foot flotilla. Included was  an estimate of the salt water displacement tonnage of the three units. One should view the displacement comparison of the two tugs to the barge and consider the effect of the current. On a near similar transit with a very large floating oil rig  and three,  much less capable tugs,  it was exciting. JGD</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 11:15:09 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: 72 ColRegs and a Japanese Destroyer | gCaptain.com</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/72_colregs_and_a_japanese_destroyer_gcaptaincom/#comment-1348643</link><description>Exactly what I signed on for; mishaps at sea. The reported article about a destroyer and a Japanese fishing boat is reminiscent of so many similar incidents  that I hardly had to peruse the report. Regardless several reported items immediately attracted my attention: an Aegis class Japanese destroyer; 10 officers on the bridge; Seitko Maru was sighted 2 minutes before being cut in half; 2 crew members were monitoring and using radar and the visibility was 10 km at night. Some may consider these mitigating factors and others special circumstance, but my first reaction in understanding what may have happened was to review the language of Rule 2 of the Navigation Rules, specifically “ which may make departure from these rules necessary to avoids immediate danger.” &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;My experiences, and many were bad, lead me to believe that accidents are caused, they don’t just happen.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Most of my years at sea were in Asian waters mostly in command of three different ships. However in every ship I was in we had at least one narrow escape in the approaches to or in the  Uraga Channel to Yokosuka, Yokohama and Tokyo, Japan. That entire area should be classified a” Rule 2 Special Zone.” With as many as 50 radar contacts and maybe 20 vessels in sight one must quickly determine is it make the ETA or just arrive without mishap.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Specifically, I have trouble understanding 10 officer on the bridge unless the captain was holding an awards ceremony or qualifying watch officers. A bridge organization and management concept is to have adequate personnel to accomplish safe navigation and operations, and no unnecessary on lookers. Good ship management precludes  unnecessary visitors on navigation bridges in times of sensitive operations. &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;In a warship, specially in an Aegis class destroyer that is the equivalent of 100 Radio Shacks and the Los Angeles International Airport Control Tower, it is inconceivable that only two crewmen were monitoring surface search radars and observing surface traffic. The purpose of AEGIS is electronic surveillance. Just today an Aegis class ship blasted a satellite out of existence 130 miles away.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Lastly to have sighted a vessel two minutes earlier and then cut it in half can only happen if it is rammed. Regardless whether privileged or not, to cut, what appears to be a well constructed steel hulled vessel in half is a major achievement and requires considerable force; therefore one might consider there was no doubt involved.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Let us now consider  some of the possible special circumstances. For those of you that have read my novel “DD891" about 30 years of destroyer life, you will recall the role of the Commodore; a senior officer embarked to supervise and coordinate the operations of others etc., and also the skippers immediate boss. If  ATAGO&lt;br&gt;was completing readiness training or undergoing an operational inspection or tests an embarked senior and staff would be on board; supervising, observing and maybe interfering. That may account for the 10 officers on the bridge. &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Japanese mariners and warrior are dedicated, educated, proud, respectful and loyal seaman to a fault. Disgrace is the worst sin and disrespect an unforgivable error. The concept of the BRM includes voicing concern about decisions and actions that may be faulty. In the U.S. we feel  no compunction of telling the skipper, “ HEY CAP, YOU FUCKED UP!” Some of our concepts in management and operations are foreign to others. Whether others have or will adjust or not is an academic exercise and will be with us for some time. But the safety of life at sea is a pledge we sailors have made to each other and it must be enforced in the every day practice of seaman. &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;This is my initial review of this unfortunate mishap that was caused by any number of things. I do not have all the facts but hopefully will get an opportunity to study them and learn some valuable lessons. Unfortunately, I fear we know the facts and are again viewing a situation that should have never occurred. I invite my fellow mariners, seafarers and afficionados to join in the comments and submit your views.</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 21 Feb 2008 16:05:47 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: 72 ColRegs and a Japanese Destroyer | gCaptain.com</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/72_colregs_and_a_japanese_destroyer_gcaptaincom/#comment-1348644</link><description>Captain Mike has made a valid point. Navy Regulations require line officers, now called surface warfare specialists, be given ship handling training. mandatory! A C.O. nightmare. But it can be accomplished in a number of safe and effective ways, but one ineffective way is to undertake  such education in an unsupervised manner ( O.K. Mr Jones,  you got the conn, lets see how you do!) specially in a congested water way or at critical times. I found my merchant marine time provided me little ship handling experience, but I did learn a number of thing that did not work, and, I observed some great seamsnship that I emulated in later life. Two of the best ship handlers I knew had identical views; some can do it and some can't.  Select those that can and work with them; talk it over, do a chart drill, read the books ( there are some real good ones, but make sure they are based on experience not simulator philosphy). There are three categories of ship handlers: Great, Good and those that think they are great. I was pleased to be  considered good although I clobbered  a couple of buoys, damged a crane and ran aground once because I had not planned the job and prepared myself for every probable situation. A great pilot told me, "If you worry about the job enough, it will turn out o.k."</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 22 Feb 2008 11:23:20 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Agato Destroyer Collision:  Bridge Management Questions | gCaptain.com</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/agato_destroyer_collision_bridge_management_questions_gcaptaincom/#comment-1348809</link><description>During the investigations at APL preceeding the SAS program, we discovered that most at sea incidents between vessels occurred at watch changing time. A survey on &lt;a href="http://gCaptain.com" rel="nofollow"&gt;gCaptain.com&lt;/a&gt; confirmed that. On naval vssels this is  managed by bridge personnel verifying reports  and exchanging and verifyhing data ( what we see)  between CIC and bridge lookouts, OOD and JOOD and JOOW and POOW. Something like the change of sentries passing on orders. But it has to practiced and enforced, and that is not easy! In some of the better ships, lookout training is mandatory. At one time in the US Navy there was a special rating badge. In merchant ships, the only procedure I can suggest, and this is from experience, is the Master talks to all topside watch standers and reminds them of the importance of communication, and enforces the role lookouts play; they are a major member of  the ship security and safety team, not just some one standing a boring watch. It' s helpful if one knows the laws about lookouts and the key role they play in trials. In an admiralty case some years ago, an involved captain , said, "That G.D. loookout has my license in his hands."</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 23 Feb 2008 11:11:17 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: M/V Cougar Ace - Marine Salvage Through A Geek&amp;#8217;s Glasses | gCaptain.com</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/mv_cougar_ace_marine_salvage_through_a_geek8217s_glasses_gcaptaincom/#comment-1349322</link><description>Excellent video and audio report on another car ship accident. With Boots &amp;amp; Coots firefigfhers and Titan Salvage all we need is JohnWayne to play the role.  The possible pollution factor is alarming; how often it is almost! I read into this, somewhere we have licensed people either not doing their job properly, or are incompetent  or not supervising . Slack tanks is one thing, but deballasting a sea is unbelieable. There is always the possibility that the bridge watch officer was assigned this "routine" task. Many ship have ballant controls on the bridge .  Except for some heroic efforts, Alaska would be involved in another oily mess.</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 27 Feb 2008 16:20:25 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Sea Stories - Training At&amp;nbsp;Sea</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/sea_stories_training_atnbspsea/#comment-1348298</link><description>Eric: Each process has its benefits. Some schools are better than others and each has its alumni association ; that is beneficial. If I were you, I would write to each school and tell them what you want to do...don’t mention why because they are not interested, besides they are not hiring you. Basically they want your money. &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Regardless of route to the bridge, it is up to the individual. I am a mixture of both routes and feel my few achievements were because  I was available at the right time and was qualified; later, experience helped.  Education today is more important than in the past because the industry is geared to electronics and automation. At 36 years of age, I don’t think you’d be happy in a college unless you had a role, other than just a student. That is a possibility. See what offers you get from academia.  &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;There are many opportunities to get started. Pick up copies of Maritime Reporter, Pacific Maritime Magazine, or Marine News they have all kinds of jobs etc. Piney Point, Maryland  is an excellent union operated school and produces a good product. On the internet try “Maritime Jobs.com” there are jobs today. &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Again if were you I would start by getting a job with MSTS (Navy) or some non union employer and try the business for a test period. You may not like it. The glamour is mostly gone; conditions are good, but the work is either hard or boring. Cruise lines are hiring constantly. You’ll need to get seaman’s papers and that alone may discourage you. Lastly you can hang around the waterfront and ask questions maybe some one will feel sorry for you and give you some better advice. And, if you still want to go to sea, don’t give up, the opportunity is there if you persevere. JGD &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;—thye ar4e not hiringuas e theyare not interested.ou wanto .The answer to your query is up to you. There are factors that one should consider and decisions one must make. At age 36, you are probably too old to be accepted for enrollment in a state or federal maritime school. But that does not mean you should write to each one and shop. Nor does that mean I recommend a school. First academies provide a type of education that academically prepares  one to pass the license exams and provide an encounter with most factions of the business. The comradeship is outstanding and its connections are cherished and can be enjoyed for years. As a undergraduate, you of course acquire a college education; even the C students are smarter than most. But in you case, wasted. &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;On the other hand with your background one can apply for a job with MSTS for example pr go to Piney Point and pick up the basics and apply yourself at sea for several years and see if this is what you really want to do. If you are married then you have an additional problem trying to keep a marriage alive. Life at sea is not difficult except when you are not busy. A god student can pass the time in study and practicing new skills, but that precludes being one of the guys and be sociable.</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 12:35:48 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Sea Stories - Training At&amp;nbsp;Sea</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/sea_stories_training_atnbspsea/#comment-1348310</link><description>Excuse me---disregard the last part, it was an earlier draft. JGD</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 12:58:51 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Sea Stories - Training At&amp;nbsp;Sea</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/sea_stories_training_atnbspsea/#comment-1348300</link><description>Merchant mariner training. There are  two concepts (1) teach the subject (2) teach the exam. If you can't pass the exam the knowledge is of little use. Employers look at the license and endorsements and hope the ticketee has skill; that is one reason why there is so many complaints about cadets. Regardless of the concept, it is the teacher that makes the course. An experienced mariner teaching a subject he knows will in most cases produce a good student, if the student wants to learn. Aboard ship, there is no other alternative; no place to go and litttle else to occupy ones' mind.  Several of my shipmates could recite the Rules of the Road verbatim but did not have clue as to what they meant. Company cadets were probably the best trained depending on the tutors. The ATS in WW11 had an excellent program but no teachers. USMOS produced some of the best mariners-officers because they were qualified motivated seaman before they entered the program and all teachers were professionals.</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 29 Feb 2008 18:56:46 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: US Coast Guard gets tough with it&amp;#8217;s image | gCaptain.com</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/us_coast_guard_gets_tough_with_it8217s_image_gcaptaincom/#comment-1349447</link><description>Perusal of the  Commandants ALCOAST 108/08, is worthwhile. It not only addresses the concern of many U.S. merchant mariners, but their employers and the interested public. I consider the directive an apology in sense and an attempt to change an institutional attitude; both steps in the right direction.&lt;br&gt; Of importance is the inclusion of foreign mariners in the USCG conduct improvement guidelines; our mariners are not alone in the battle for survival at sea and responsible government treatment at sea and ashore. The role of the USCG as an agent of marine safety, national security and protection is unquestioned: it is  a proud history. But the role of stewardship of the U.S. Merchant Marine is less than stellar, simply because of attitude! &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;Soon the Commandant and Congressman Elijah Cummings (D. Md) and committee will meet in sessions and discuss the USCG future. Hopefully ALCOAST 108/08 will be a major discussion item. The U.S. Merchant Marine is often referred to as an arm of the U.S. armed forces, because of  the critical role played in wars. The merchant marine is not just mariners and ships, but a vital industry involved in nearly every manufactured item in the U.S.A. and most oversea  products.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt; In government, efficiency is a power word. One can change almost anything if it is becomes more efficient. The management and stewardship of the candidates for licenses as master, mate, pilots and engineers and documents for mariners needs effective supervision and professional administration. Candidates should be “duly examined and found competent “ by  qualified senior, experienced equals and not attested to by the signature of a Boatswain Mate Chief, USCG, by direction.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;The present  process  of selecting and filling in squares and issuing licenses and documents to people questionably  prepared to fulfill the duties required by law and good seamanship based primarily on computer graded tests is efficiently inappropriate. Hopefully the Commandant and the Congressman will view this with concern and make positive changes to remedy a deteriorating system. &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;As I learned at sea, never complain unless one has a better idea; Civilianize  the merchant marine licensing and documentation local branches of the USCG and staff with experienced licensed and documented merchant mariner. Release the  Guard to serve in their primary role. JGD</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 09 Mar 2008 09:10:05 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: INSTRUCTIONS - MAN OVERBOARD | gCaptain.com</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/instructions_man_overboard_gcaptaincom/#comment-1349530</link><description>The coments are  what  I experienced when I first read the article. What transpired was "discussion",  something no one had done before. After pulling a number of people out of the water I learned no one could  see the ship or life ring  because the height of eye of the MOB is maybe one foot.   The flare increases the probable visual sight distance. Noise travels well over water. Any sign  is better than none as hope is all one originally has.  At night or in fog. every item in the water must be visited, that takes time and may require additional maneuvering; it is  a gamble, but one target limits the odds.  A  self made flotation pillow (pants are great) can support a person for hours,  in some cases longer. There are two situations to consider: MOB in sight; don't screw around, go get him as fast as feasible. Not insight: select most  probable mean of search. Several points are critical (1) know someone  is looking for you if not stay afloat and near wake. (2) know what to expect if  a search is started (3) How can I help me?  &lt;br&gt;The recovery people must understand the dynamics of recovery: ship recovery has problesm with propellors, suctions and freeboard. Boat recovery one must determine is MOB alert or unconcious. Strong swimmer; how strong and can he/she do it alone?  Best training is a pre-event discussions.</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 15 Mar 2008 06:12:21 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: INSTRUCTIONS - MAN OVERBOARD | gCaptain.com</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/instructions_man_overboard_gcaptaincom/#comment-1349529</link><description>Good question. The surfac smoke float ( best estimate to start search) and a float supported body will drift with the wind surface  current at a similar rate. Regardless of where the MOB actially fell overboard the search is started where the searchers believe is the best place ( if not insight)  and that (the smoke float) moves with  the wind surface current . A problem may exist with  GPS as it provides a specific position with out regard to current.  I have no expereience with Satellite or GPS assisted searches, but tracked  smoke floats during searches. Lat &amp;amp; Long changed but we were always with the smoke float.  Would like some feedback on electronic  assisted searches. Have you though about actual recovery? JGD</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 15 Mar 2008 19:40:28 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Criminal Charges filed against Cosco Busan Pilot | gCaptain.com</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/criminal_charges_filed_against_cosco_busan_pilot_gcaptaincom/#comment-1349680</link><description>Sailors beware. The U.S. Justice Department is so un-busy that they jumped in front of the Californate State ALJ procedings (Bar Pilot Commission), the USCG hearing and the congrsssional and state hearing to nail some one for the COSCO BUSAN allision and subsequent spill oil. Is there a statute of limitatins here? It seems to me any shaft alley lawyer would wonder why does Justice want to try some guy that has not been found guilty of anything yet.  What happens if John Meadows ( a smart and tricky guy) pulls one of his tricks and get Cota off ( medication, not the person directing the navigation etc.  In any event, the damage has been done and now the best process it to let due process grind on, normally. With the federal court system overloaded with more important work (terrorism, drugs, your every day crimes, political feasance),  hopefully the others will get their work done first.  There are two facts, COSCO BUSAN allided with the fender on D tower, and some  oil was spilled. No one has answered why it happened or how it occured.  Be careful ,waterboarding has not been disallowed. JGD.</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Tue, 18 Mar 2008 03:38:37 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Ocean Prediction Center Requests Comments | gCaptain.com</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/ocean_prediction_center_requests_comments_gcaptaincom/#comment-1350119</link><description>Suggset NOAA contact any APL skipper and discuss the use of weather routing used  and Dr Henry Chen of OSI. When at APL this propgram was successfully employed.</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 11 Apr 2008 00:49:33 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: TROUBLE ON OILY WATERS - MV COSCO BUSAN vs THE BRIDGE ON SAN FRANCISCO BAY | gCaptain.com</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/trouble_on_oily_waters_mv_cosco_busan_vs_the_bridge_on_san_francisco_bay_gcaptaincom/#comment-1350125</link><description>Kennebec Captain.&lt;br&gt;Great professional response and good comments.&lt;br&gt;"Mental DR" is my term. While conning I subliminally kept a mental chart in my mind as to where I  was without refering  to a chart or radar. I used the radar as a frequent check in good visibility, in fog it was the basis of my navigation, but I was prepared to not have it available.  The track of the vessel  is to be maintained bythe ship and the person directing the navigation is to be kept informed etc. Frequently in delta fog one is in and out in matter of minutes, sometimes while approaching a berth or bridge e.g., Antioch. One needs to instantly know where you are and what is around. One can not run to a radar and try and find things on whikle proceeding ahead down curreent. It is also referred to as chart  rehearsal. Refer Ch 9 Merchant Marine Officers Handbook. &lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;ONE EIGHTEEN  In my original work charts are included but John Konrad pays for most  of the blog and he cant afford everhthing. If you want I will send you an original Send me  your email address. This will be a  feature piece in my forthcoming book "Collisionsa ,Allisions and Slovenly Seamanship."&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;SF Citizen et al., Sorry I been on the Mississippi learning what high water does to a great route. No TV or internet and happy hour started at 3PM. JGD</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Fri, 11 Apr 2008 11:43:57 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Sailor, the Nose&amp;nbsp;Knows!</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/sailor_the_nosenbspknows/#comment-1350465</link><description>If you want the pictures send me an email address. JGD</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 30 Apr 2008 11:55:36 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Sailor, the Nose&amp;nbsp;Knows!</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/sailor_the_nosenbspknows/#comment-1350467</link><description>Seems we should form a club, get a ring or a neck tie, maybe a lapel pin. Yes it can happen to you, again,  and I was surprised at the number of victims I have discovered. The skin docs say most of the damage is done before one is 18. So watch your kids. Best prevention they say is to apply a sun screen with a sun protection  factor of 15 or greater when outdoors. The wide brimmed hat only protects what is shaded. Those ball caps with hole in the back; NO. And don’t forget the ears. As the sun approaches its zenith, it is most powerful, therefore, get  a night job or ask for the 4 to 8 watch. Golf fees are usually reduced after 4PM. JGD</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 01 May 2008 03:14:51 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Where are the&amp;nbsp;Inspectors?</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/where_are_thenbspinspectors/#comment-1350927</link><description>One Eighteen: That is the point. The USCG calls itself a military organization in its mission statement therefore it seems to me it has placed the commercial maritime interests of the country in a "we also" category as indicated ( extract of USCG Mission)&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;During the past decade, the number of American lives lost each year in boating accidents has declined significantly. The Coast Guard's Marine Safety Program promotes safety through its regulatory and inspections roles, inspecting merchant vessels, and licensing their masters and crews. The Coast Guard Auxiliary provides free boating safety courses, courtesy marine examinations for recreational boaters, aids to navigation verification and inspections of commercial facilities.&lt;br&gt;&lt;br&gt;The Merchant Marine licensing, investigation and accident reporting function can easily be returned to civilian employees. There is an abundance of licensed and documented mariners available to staff and properly conduct any anticipated workload, even clean up back logs. Let the uniforms handle the other stuff. The change will not alter any manning,qualifications and safety problems but can improve communications and the effectiveness of service.</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 29 May 2008 10:26:53 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Oil Spill In Mississippi&amp;nbsp;River</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/oil_spill_in_mississippinbspriver/#comment-1351699</link><description>The August issue  of Pacific Maritime Magazine VOX OCEANUS discusses the shortcomings of simulation and the failure of management to resolve the causes of problems. Consequently, until owners/operators and managers are involved and accountable, we shall see more of the same. JGD</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Thu, 24 Jul 2008 12:14:16 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Rough Week for Cruise Ship&amp;nbsp;Passengers</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/rough_week_for_cruise_shipnbsppassengers/#comment-1351789</link><description>Storms in that area at this time of year are not uncommon and are dangerous. Maybe it is because they are upside down and backwards? On several occasions in the U.S. Lines (A.P. Line) "fast packets" (Victory ships) , and in a navy destroyer we had to radically change course to ease the strain. It is not the sea but the schedule that  causes the damage. Most, not all, but most storms can be minimized if one is not trying to make a schedule or follow a track. Few Captains have that authority but if they do, casualties can be minimized. One pays  either in delayed arrival or ship damage.  It is better one arrive late and ready than to arrive and not able to function.   JGD</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Sat, 02 Aug 2008 03:33:24 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Major Order for Wärtsilä 50DF&amp;nbsp;Engines</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/major_order_for_wartsila_50dfnbspengines/#comment-1351862</link><description>Lately there has been some exciting news about the development of new diesel engines with improved emissions, cost and effectiveness. But what is not discussed is the operating and maneuvering characteristics of the improved motors. While piloting a 60,000 BHP 12 cylinder 800-1000 foot ship one must stop and start the engine often while in congested waters. Therefore knowing the capacity for start and stops (usually with compressed air) is essential and should be included in the operating information. Also, while transiting waterways, confined channels and canals an almost wakeless transit is sometimes required. Many engines have a minimum RPM that exceeds safe navigation speeds.therefore pilots must devise means  to reduce the speed of advance (anchors, tugs or stop and starts.) The rules for safe speed includes wakes. Ship owners may save on fuel but may have to pay for tugs. JGD</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Sun, 10 Aug 2008 17:05:06 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Incident Photo of The Week - Head On&amp;nbsp;Collision</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/incident_photo_of_the_week_head_onnbspcollision/#comment-1352028</link><description>Speculation only. In river accidents the rudder is always the suspect. If  found to be operationally sound and orders were appropriate, the next area of investigation are the channel dimensions and a querry on bank suction. A right hand turning propeller smelling a good bank gradient can sheer a ship 30 degrees easily even with hard-over opposite rudder. Instinct is to increase speed; it only exacberate problem,  I'll bet on bank suction</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 13 Aug 2008 03:27:12 -0000</pubDate></item><item><title>Re: Coming Ashore? 10 Things You Should Do When&amp;nbsp;Interviewing</title><link>http://gcaptain.disqus.com/coming_ashore_10_things_you_should_do_whennbspinterviewing/#comment-2936712</link><description>A frequently used technique in the business world is to provide a situation and ask, "Have you experienced this and -- how did you handle it?"  Not how would you, but how did you. Some will ask how it came out and what would you do differently. concept is past is prologue and did person learn . Hiring ashore is different from the sea. The factors are different salary, benefits,, conditions, representation, politics and personal life style and plans. When I went ashore after 20 yearas at sea, I looked for THE job. not a job. . JGD</description><dc:creator xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/">John G. Denham</dc:creator><pubDate>Wed, 08 Oct 2008 10:37:01 -0000</pubDate></item></channel></rss>