Disqus - Latest Comments for berger

Re: More on the Missing Evidence of Anxiety

berger — Sun, 02 Sep 2007 20:49:47 -0000

I guess I agree with your specific response to Ross but here's where you lose me on your larger argument:

"Many people will surely be temporarily upset when the shifting incentives of the global market upset their usual patterns of work and life, very much as people in the Rustbelt were upset by the process of deindustrialization."

Is this really the analogy you want to use here? First of all, the rustbelt hasn't recovered!! There has been no upswing nor is there any prospect of one. Second of all, you can already see some (albeit small) signs of populism ther - the election of Sherrod Brown being the most glaring.
Lastly, yes, when people become interested in making government bigger in order to effect large welfare programs you have populism. Are you being deliberately obtuse here or what?

Re: The Hazards of “Libertarian Paternalism” and Political “Choice Architecture”

berger — Thu, 03 Apr 2008 10:16:18 -0000

It seems to me that if you concede that there is no such thing as neutral choice architecture then your objection to "libertarian paternalism" can't really be that it interferes with free choice (because this is now inevitable) but that there's some sort of intentionality or thought process that's gone into disposing our architectures one way or another. But given that our various architectures are going to be biased one way or another, why not put some thought into those choices?

Re: The Place of Post-Constitutional Choice Architecture

berger — Fri, 04 Apr 2008 11:56:31 -0000

Wow - thanks for your response! I see - and am sympathetic to - your point but I'm still not sure how liberty can be promoted through choice architecture. Doesn't this seem sort of contradictory to you, as a libertarian? You write:

"The point of liberal constitutional rules is precisely to bias political choice in the direction of liberty."

If consituttional rules are really supposed to bias us one way or another to what extent can they really be concerned with our liberty? How can a constitution "bias the outcome in favor of liberty"? Aren't these terms sort of mutually exclusive? I get that liberty can be a good, and not just a right, but once it is a good haven't we given up the premise that political bodies shouldn't decide what's good and bad for people?
The whole example of organ donation is an interesting one. If I'm right, you're afraid that an inappropriate chocie architecture will not foster a concern for choice and individual responsibility...but, again, once you've agreed that such ideals can be "fostered" don't you have to admit that these ideals are not rights at all but values? Indeed, aren't they the most personal sorts of values, the one's that pertain to an individual's body? If the state is going to influence how we think ro feel about such an issue I can't see how it could do so in a way that promotes "our own" decision...
Again, thanks for your response. If you can direct me towards any libertarian literature on this it would be much appreciated.

Re: The Bitter Truth

berger — Thu, 17 Apr 2008 15:01:25 -0000

In wonder what was going on around 2000 that made that number spike up...hmmm.......

Re: John Cassidy on Libertarian Paternalism: Way Too Libertarian!

berger — Sat, 24 May 2008 05:28:08 -0000

I don't think this is very convincing, as it's precisely Cassidy's contention that politicians and other policy makers are equipped to make better decisions than us masses. This seems to me to be a rather uncontroversial assertion - it's just a matter of how much you want to extend the reach of such "decision makers" (not whether you want to have them at all).

Of course the key to Cassidy's approach is a move away from thinking about public policy as a matter of decisions and to consider it more as (ideally) a rational science. Cassidy is not all holding out that someone else should make decisions for you - classical paternalism - he's saying we should organize our government around the science of human behavior (a science that wasn't exhausted by Horatio Alger). You may want to call this a technocratic paternalism but, if so, you have to put your finger on what exactly is wrong with a technocracy. (Why is technocratic paternalism worse than irrational liberalism? Here I think the liberal answer is inevitably going to lean more towards religion than science.)

Of course whether or not it's the government who should make these decisions is another matter. But I think it's easy to see why Cassidy would argue that an objective government official might have a more dispassionate view what you need to save for retirement or what kind of mortgages are really feasible. Further, the private sector is organized around individual interests, so it's hard to see what kind of objective view it might be able to hold forth on how people make decisions.

Re: “Irrational” Choice and the Persistence of Lives Well-Lived

berger — Wed, 28 May 2008 01:05:11 -0000

Micha asks: "The focus is paternalism: is it okay to treat adults as if they were children? ... Or does the fact that government actors are just as (if not more) flawed as non-government actors make the discoveries of behavioral economics irrelevant to questions of paternalism?"

Behavioral economics is obviously irrelevant if all the "government actors" have going for them is that they work for the government. But Cassidy -and other "paternalists" of his stripe - aren't saying that the mere acquisition of some political recognition is what makes a good policy maker. Indeed, he's pretty clearly saying that those who best understand why/how people make the decisions they do - as well as the potentially destructive consequences of their actions - are the ones who should make those decisions.

If behavioral economics is a kind of paternalism then it is a very distinct kind of paternalism - one that makes a claim to objective reality, and not just the innate, superior juridical powers of the some few. This doesn't mean that lives "can't be lived well" outside of this "expertise," only that the expertise is (much like biology) really, really helpful to seeing what's going on in the world. (Lives were "good" before Darwin - no?)

Re: Shaun Nichols on Free Will (Among Other Things) on Free Will

berger — Sun, 01 Jun 2008 21:19:28 -0000

Is it just my imagination or dismiss the idea of fee will in this bhtv? It seems like you do - for a bit - and then decide that free will is just a fact ...?

Is the Chomsky connection in Rawls really that peculiar...? Seems like it's well in line with Rawls's Kantianism to me.

Re: This Week on Free Will: Jonathan Haidt

berger — Mon, 09 Jun 2008 12:58:25 -0000

write this book

Re: No Dice, Pickens!

berger — Tue, 09 Sep 2008 01:07:07 -0000

I don't quite see how Pickens is an economic illiterate speaking nonsense. Will seems to object that he isn't telling the whole story, that he doesn't appreciate how "the reason Americans bought all this oil from abroad was that they had no way to get more energy bang for their energy buck," but Pickens isn't really interested in this point - or he's speaking passed it. I take it that Pickens' point is that, esp. over the long term, our investment in foreign oil isn't mutually beneficial.

If we were to pay now and invest in locally produced energy sources the cost would be dramatic, at least in the short term - but Pickens (as I understand him) seems to suggest that such short term costs are worth it, economically but also in terms of the environment and national security.

This would obviously put some strain on the ability to create certain types of jobs ("stifling creativity") but why exactly wouldn't it help create others again? Does the money just get flushed down the toilet?

I am an economic illiterate so any help here is appreciated.

Re: Naomi Klein

berger — Wed, 17 Sep 2008 23:01:19 -0000

The use of Rorty here is priceless. If there's one thing that Rorty is not doing in this essay its offering a logical argument refutating Marxism - the very idea of such a refutation is antithetical to his whole epistemology...so what does it say about the philosophical defense of Milton if it has to turn to Rorty and his many narratives?

Tthere seems to be little attention here not only to Rorty's actual thought (particularly the role of literatire in it) but also concern for the meanings of words banal and untheoretical (though by the end of his complaint Will comes around to what R had in mind).

Re: Pluralism and the Strains of Commitment

berger — Wed, 17 Sep 2008 23:03:55 -0000

Yeah, I think you've pretty much nailed the communitarian critique of Rawls here.

Re: The Segway of Social Science

berger — Mon, 29 Sep 2008 22:37:45 -0000

Wow - this seems pretty caustic...especially when you seem to grant their central premise: there is no such thing as neutral choice architecture. Perhaps S and T don't emphasize this enough to your liking (though you maintain, simultaneously, that they "make a great deal of the idea") but once you've agreed to this empirical observation (done, of course, by those elitist scientists...with all their knowledge) the notion of freedom that you want to maintain is highly curtailed - and thus your own slippery slope argument is unconvincing. Thus you end up simultaneously warning against any encroachment on freedom and granting that freedom ain't what it used to be. You're already on the slippery slope.
In this way, your complaint that, in the end, the libertarianism of libertarian paternalism is secured only "good will" is both flat and true at the same time. Yes, like most political arrangements, LP would be L only to the extent that there exists some form of will behind it. And, yes, paternalism (being natural) would be ineluctable - but this is because it is inevitable while libertarianism is not. This leaves you in the especially precarious position of embracing "realignment" on the psychological level while chastising it on the level of policy. Why does it scare you in one case and not in another? Does this become a quarrel not about freedom but efficiency and/or (gulp) expertise?

(Damn Elites!! Here they come again with all their crazy science talk.)

Re: More Thoughts on “Choice Architecture” and “Libertarian Paternalism”

berger — Thu, 02 Oct 2008 03:39:32 -0000

First of all, I really like the blog's new look (and the blog generally of course). Secondly, I agree that S&T are engaging in the sort of "beyond left and right" (ugh) rhetoric that is worthy of a politician. Yet I don't quite understand why "libertarian paternalism" is such innate conceptual contradiction and the ideas of "choice" (liberty) and "architecture" can be so easily reconciled. If choice can be designed/administrated, then what's the problem with paternalism? The problem, it seems, is less whether or not choice is curtailed (it obviously is, and in a pretty profound manner) but rather the role of government. So: why is government administered choice so much worse than any other form (whether it evolves from culture or the contingencies of life)? S&T obviously want a _democratic_ government - built on transparency and accountability - to be promoting some choices and discouraging others, so we are quite a ways away from any kind of totalitarianism here (the importance they place on individual choice, as a value, is clear enough evidence of this). What's the problem with this form of paternalism then? Is it really the intentions behind it? (What do those matter?) Some slippery slope argument? (Once we've admitted choice is always hindered, aren't we already on that slope?)

Re: Naomi Klein Quote of the Day

berger — Fri, 12 Dec 2008 11:23:51 -0000

How many exclamation points will you drop on her in your debate? If I we're you I'd stick to 3 - 4 max. You want to save the "!!!!!" for a debate with Frank.