Disqus - Latest Comments for TGGP

Re: Liberty in Context

TGGP — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 18:04:01 -0000

Why put economics in its own separate box? Economic freedom is just one aspect of any person's freedom.

It's impossible to really justify anything in an objective sense. It generally boils down to "Cause I said so", with unjustified dispositions behind that. My opposition to state coercion is grounded in egoist paranoia. I combine that with the pragmatic recognition that demanding others accept my priorities (including libertarianism, hence the meta-libertarianism) isn't going to fly without any special reason to say I equivalently shouldn't be forced to accept the priorities of others, so that a rational-choice contractarian framework along the lines of Narveson & de Jasay is the better bet. I'm not interested in imaginary "social contracts" though, but an actual, physical one of the sort that might be used in the creation of an intentional community or treaty between communities. I don't say "justice, though the heavens may fall" (or think any such thing exists), but "let's make a deal".

Re: Liberty in Context

TGGP — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 17:49:15 -0000

What constitutes "undue"? It seems to me that liberals have moral disagreements with conservatives and when there are outcomes one or the other doesn't like they are all apt to call it "undue" and say if you squint and look from the right angle it's really unfree.

Re: Liberty in Context

TGGP — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 17:37:42 -0000

As I said at IOZ, someone really consistent in their libertarianism winds up an anarchist. Since you admit to not quite being a libertarian, I can't be surprised that you don't go for anarchism.

Would you object to the existence of communities that value honesty and/or anti-racism and use social sanction against those who don't fit such norms?

Unlike Jay, I do value individual liberty (such as my own). However, I do not commit the Stirnerite fallacy in thinking that any constraint, including those voluntarily undertaken, constitutes a violation of such liberty. My acceptance of communities stems not from some value that a community has over and above the individuals that comprise it (you could also substitute "God" in the case of theistic communities, but I'm an atheist anyway), but mere recognition that communities are among the things valued by individuals. My acceptance of divergent particularisms derives from a basically liberal universalism. Aside from being anti-social and personally placing a low value in community, that actually doesn't make me too different from most philosophical "communitarians", at least according to Jeffrey Friedman. Jeffrey thinks liberalism itself is a mistake which both libertarians and communitarians need to get over.

Re: Liberty in Context

simonkinahan — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 17:25:24 -0000

Certainly there are courses of action that would become impossible (or at least harder) in a libertarian world. Obviously I need to tighten up my reasoning up-thread somewhat - I was thinking specifically in terms of lifestyle choices that are mostly independent of economic organization.

But while libertarianism as such is indifferent to these issues, I don't agree that its completely orthogonal to them. A preference for libertarian government is impossible to justify separate from some kind of liberal ethical framework. Seperate from that, concern with minimizing state coercion just degenerates into preferring some local set of norms, usually quite illiberal, under the illusion that its "natural" where its actually locally enforced through social pressure if not actual violence. That's a kind of conservatism, and there's nothing very libertarian about it.

Re: Liberty in Context

Gorgias — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 17:22:47 -0000

I don't think anyone is concerned about the formation of communities, but I do think the left-libertarian contingent is concerned with the creation of communities that have undue coercive powers over its members. It's not hard to see why there's an increase of liberty when prevailing social mores turn in a more tolerant direction, as, say, increasing acceptance for different religions and different sexual lifestyles have increased religious and sexual freedom in our society.

I can only speak for myself here, and I'm not sure if Mr. Wilkinson would agree- but if you want to create a community for people to live in highly traditional, male head of household marriages, go for it. The problem becomes when social stigma (and particularly social coercion exercised through the workplace, where finding alternatives is much more difficult than in any other social endeavor) is such that the only meaningful choice for many is male head of household marriage.

Re: Liberty in Context

simonkinahan — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 16:59:28 -0000

To me this: "I don't value individual liberty ... People should be able to live in communities that share values and which shame or shun people who don't fit" is a normative statement that's at odds with liberal values and therefore also at odds with any kind of consistent ethics that features libertarianism as a preferably system of government. Its probably not at odds with anarchism, but I have hard time believing in a community close-knit enough to "shame and shun" those who don't fit in is going to put up for long with their protection agents preventing them from taking it a step further. But then I'm not an anarchist, for closely related reasons.

I don't for one minute believe that humans would ever prefer to be "transitory inhabitants of cosmopoli filled with atomized strangers" but I think we need to distinguish between Community and "community". Very often when we talk about communities we mean transitory, optional coalitions of individuals that form for specific purposes and that are only part-time. I can participate in the "community" of internet liberaltarain political philosophy, but I can also turn off the computer and go and have dinner with my wife, at low (probably negative!) cost. This is a very different thing from a Community that you're born in and expected to die in and live by its standards while you're there, amongst "like minded people (like us)". The former is a modern invention, dependent for its existence on the liberal, egalitarian, rationalist metaculture that surrounds it. If anyone starts with the shaming and shunning I can reduce my participation or leave without needing to completely transform my life. The latter is the way people lived throughout most of history. The record speaks for itself. Its not good.

Re: Liberty in Context

TGGP — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 15:14:27 -0000

A libertarian can accept the divergent desires of various individuals as valid for said individuals. Among those desires may be the desire to form like-minded communities (they're all over the internet!). If people would rather be transitory inhabitants of cosmopoli filled with atomized strangers, libertarians can accept that as well.

I don't think anything Jay said was incompatible with anarchy either, so it's not a demand for the state to privilege anything.

Re: Liberty in Context

TGGP — Tue, 27 Oct 2009 01:12:44 -0000

Robin Hanson likes the competitive process itself. Comparing Eliezer's benevolent Singleton scenario to Hanson's "hardscrapple" future of nanobot colonies, I have to say I agree. I suppose I'm just extremely distrustful of anything trying to second-guess the process and paranoid about anything capable of doing so.

Re: Liberty in Context

Name — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 22:36:10 -0000

Ms. Hansons post, and the comments were interesting. Apparently, everyone agrees the market can be a cold, mean place, but libertarians/conservatives think most people are capable of surviving the struggle, and will emerge smarter, successful and better equipped for the next fight. And they'll create a bunch of wealth while they're at it. Liberals seem to believe that unless you were born rich and male, the market will wear you down and ultimately kill you. To them, everyone needs lots of protection and hand holding.

I do believe the market will always "hurt" some people, but unlike most liberals, I believe these people make up a much smaller percentage of the population than they'd like to believe. Some empirical evidence: the welfare reform policies of the Clinton era.

Re: Liberty in Context

TGGP — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 18:21:17 -0000

Perhaps one side is tapped out and there are low-hanging fruit on the other side. Perhaps outcome is the natural equilibrium. What evidence can we look toward to see which interpretation seems more accurate?

Re: Liberty in Context

TGGP — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 18:18:38 -0000

You might like Robin Hanson's post on missing liberaltarians.

Re: Liberty in Context

TGGP — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 18:17:14 -0000

I agree that libertarianism is indifferent about outcomes. A libertarian order may permit things which offend conservatives. It may also permit things which offend liberals. Libertarianism is not about the same things conservatism and liberalism are, so I view it as in many ways orthogonal to both of them.

I'm as far on the pluralist (as opposed to rationalist) side of the libertarian spectrum as you can get, but I also believe that libertarianism can reduce diversity and that this is not necessarily a bad thing. I don't want Tom Friedman as a spokesperson for neoliberalism, but his "golden straitjacket" aka the "race to the bottom" are homogenizing outcomes of economic liberty which I approve of. I don't object to people forming voluntary socialist communes, as in a kibbutz. I just think they will tend to lose out. Similarly, I think common languages are good things which aid in communication. Some governments subsidize languages with a small user-base, that conflicts with libertarianism. However, a policy prohibiting use of certain languages also conflicts with libertarianism. Again, libertarianism is orthogonal to such issues.

There are lifestyle choices which would be impossible in libertopia: the lifestyle of leaching off the state!

Re: Liberty in Context

Gorgias — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 13:14:31 -0000

I'm going to go with John Stuart Mill here:

"It is the opinions men entertain, and the feelings they cherish, respecting those who disown the beliefs they deem important, which makes this country not a place of mental freedom. For a long time past, the chief mischief of the legal penalties is that they strengthen the social stigma. It is that stigma which is really effective, and so effective is it, that the profession of opinions which are under the ban of society is much less common in England, than is, in many other countries, the avowal of those which incur risk of judicial punishment. In respect to all persons but those whose pecuniary circumstances make them independent of the good will of other people, opinion, on this subject, is as efficacious as law; men might as well be imprisoned, as excluded from the means of earning their bread. Those whose bread is already secured, and who desire no favours from men in power, or from bodies of men, or from the public, have nothing to fear from the open avowal of any opinions, but to be ill-thought of and ill-spoken of, and this it ought not to require a very heroic mould to enable them to bear. There is no room for any appeal ad misericordiam in behalf of such persons. But though we do not now inflict so much evil on those who think differently from us, as it was formerly our custom to do, it may be that we do ourselves as much evil as ever by our treatment of them."

To wit, the means of earning one's bread is a fundamentally different question than whether someone will go to the prom with you. I think this is one of the few places where government intervention is justified.

To contend otherwise is to contend that a hypothetical Jim Crow south whose bigotry was enforced solely through cultural as opposed to legal means would be a place of complete freedom for African Americans, and that, now that sodomy laws have been overturned, there is no meaningful impediment to the freedom of gays and lesbians in America right now, both of which are patently absurd.

In the end, it's exactly the same reason why the "vote with your feet" refrain so often falls flat on its face. In order for that to be a meaningful protection of people's liberty, people need the resources and the predilections to move merely because they dislike the policies their government is forming. If most people are so attached to the place of their birth that they'll stick it out despite a high taxation rate, or if the average income of the area is so low that moving out is an unrealistic proposition for most of the population, federalism is not a meaningful protection of liberty.

It is not so difficult to find a tolerant social circle, and moreover, it would be an intolerable violation of liberty to even place a cultural expectation of friendship or romance with well, anyone. But it is not an intolerable violation of liberty to prevent bigotry from preventing people the means of earning their bread. Protections in the workplace against gender, religious, and racial discrimination have done our nation a host of good.

Re: Liberty in Context

TGGP — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 00:52:59 -0000

If it is an infringement of your freedom that an employer will not hire you because of your SM practices, is it also an infringement if potential partners refuse to engage in SM with you? Is it an infringement if an employer refuses to hire a known compulsive liar? I think those are all cases in which one's options (or "positive liberty") are constrained, but I don't think libertarians need to be worried about any case in which options are constrained (and in the case of liars we may be personally happy that they are constrained even if we have no opinion qua libertarianism outside of cases of fraud).

Re: Inequalities in Health Care

TGGP — Tue, 20 Oct 2009 15:33:32 -0000

You are correct that an impression about moral impressions would be included in the things Robin is critiquing, I and a number of other commenters chime in for Hume contra Robin. I don't just link to people because I agree with every point they make!

Re: Inequalities in Health Care

willwilkinson — Tue, 20 Oct 2009 10:37:24 -0000

I'm not sure this is helpful!

Why is your sense that moral propositions are bunk (meaningless? false?) not just another example of what Robin's talking about?

Re: Inequalities in Health Care

TGGP — Tue, 20 Oct 2009 10:27:01 -0000

The real issue is that moral premises and conclusions are bunk all the way down. Note that my claim is not a self-refuting moral premise, but a premise about moral premises.

Robin Hanson is discussing related matters here:
http://www.overcomingbias.com/2009/10/beware-co...

Re: Housing, Transportation, and the Politics of Path Dependency

TGGP — Sun, 30 Aug 2009 14:22:39 -0000

Cowen has said Caplan is one of the most brilliant people he knows, so perhaps you should lower your opinion of Cowen. My own ranking is Hanson > Caplan > Cowen

Re: Housing, Transportation, and the Politics of Path Dependency

TGGP — Sat, 29 Aug 2009 17:39:28 -0000

Oddly enough, Matthew Yglesias has been accused by a libertarian of overlooking the effect of regulation on density/sprawl.

I both recognize that suburbs are shaped by zoning regulations and enjoy them. I think after repealing them there would still be suburbs, since people have created them whenever they have had the wealth to do so.

Re: The “Menaissance” and Its Dickscontents

TGGP — Sat, 29 Aug 2009 13:48:30 -0000

Its odd that this discussion and many similar ones I find online focus on the question "Is it good for men?" when happiness surveys show no difference for them, but a decline for women, particularly since you take such surveys seriously. You also refer to "the fascination white guys have with Mad Men", a show written by and predominately viewed by women. Just more male-centrism from the notorious chauvinist Will Wilkinson!

I initially misread the title of this post and that it was going to refer to Reihan Salaam's idea of the "mancession", another stupid neologism. Do readers here think that the gender-composition of the work force will return to its pre-recession ratio, or have we shifted to a new equilibrium?

Re: The Trouble with Public Choice: Too Generous to Politicians

TGGP — Fri, 28 Aug 2009 19:56:29 -0000

That it is possible to get stuck on a local maxima doesn't mean you are, so evolutionary explanations are not inherently dependent on bounded rationality.

Furthermore, bounded rationality can explain why one animal might BELIEVE a signal, but not why the mutation to send out the signal spread. The benefits for signalling must have exceeded the costs.

Hanson's theory is that it is more costly for the inexperienced to signal confidence than the experienced. The experienced learn how to signal credibly. Because they actually are more experienced, it is rational for observers to consider it credible.

Re: The Trouble with Public Choice: Too Generous to Politicians

Neel Krishnaswami — Fri, 28 Aug 2009 17:39:40 -0000

Have you read much evolutionary theory? Animals evolve to give signals. If the costs of those signals exceeded the benefits, the mutations responsible would be weeded out.

Yes, I have. Evolutionary models describe a form of bounded rationality, not full rational choice -- for example, evolutionary processes can get stuck in local optima, whereas perfectly rational agents will not. That is, an evolutionary model is an explanation based on a deviation from rational choice.

If I DON'T signal overconfidence, that indicates that I probably have unusually low confidence. The experienced are more overconfident, so it is rational for observers to infer greater experience on the part of the more confident.

This is plausible, but actually establishing that this is a true explanation is very, very difficult. The problem is that this is not a stable solution concept -- you're assuming that the observer is rational, but the counterparty is not acting strategically.

Now, what happens if the counterparty decides to project confidence strategically? And what happens if the observer decides to take into account the possibility that the counterparty is acting strategically, and so on? If you treat the degree of mutual information as a parameter to the model, then the model can predict either that the signal is meaningful or that it's not meaningful, depending on the degree of common knowledge -- if you don't iterate, you get the solution you propose, and if you do, then you get the Nash equilibrium. In between, you get a transition depending on exactly how you've formulated the game.

This means that you need a method for measuring the degree of common knowledge before you can decide whether this is a true explanation or not. Without out, you have to remember that there's a word for models that can be tuned to predict anything, based on a hard-to-observe parameter with many plausible values: non-falsifiable.

Re: The Trouble with Public Choice: Too Generous to Politicians

TGGP — Fri, 28 Aug 2009 00:50:21 -0000

Have you read much evolutionary theory? Animals evolve to give signals. If the costs of those signals exceeded the benefits, the mutations responsible would be weeded out. Then there's the question of why anyone believes the signals. Signals are not noise, they give actual information, generally because the costs DIFFER depending on how accurate the signal is. If I DON'T signal overconfidence, that indicates that I probably have unusually low confidence. The experienced are more overconfident, so it is rational for observers to infer greater experience on the part of the more confident.

Re: The Trouble with Public Choice: Too Generous to Politicians

Neel Krishnaswami — Thu, 27 Aug 2009 21:09:39 -0000

Costly signals are not incompatible with rational choice. Being costly does not means that costs exceed benefits (on an individual basis). If they did, nobody would engage in them!

This is the fallacy of assuming the consequent. The rationality of this behavior is precisely what is in question.

Signals are not credible unless their costs exceed their benefits. If the benefits of a behavior exceed its costs, you have an incentive to engage in this behavior regardless, and so your opponent cannot infer anything about your true intentions from it. That's why talk is cheap.

Signaling is precisely a way to escape the Nash equilibrium: if you give credible evidence that you are not rational, then the common knowledge assumption fails, and so the theorem that says you can't do better than a Nash equilibrium now no longer holds. Of course, to send such a signal requires...not being rational about costs!

This is why Schelling was not a particularly mathematical game theorist. His idea of strategy made heavy use of manipulations of perceptions of rationality -- things which mathematical game theorists had to assume a fixed form for (common knowledge of rationality) in order to get viable solution concepts at all. This is also why many of Schelling's suggested strategies are not reflectively stable. For example, he suggests that a winning strategy in the Chicken game (drive two cars straight at each other, with the loser being the one who swerves first) is to remove your steering wheel, so that you have credibly committed to being unable to swerve away. If you do this, and your opponent is rational, then you win the game. However, if both sides do this, you get a crash, which is worse than the Nash equilibrium.

Seriously, read Schelling's The Strategy of Conflict. His prose is elegant and clear.

As an aside, this also gives a handy heuristic for judging policy debates: if someone starts talking about "credibility", that's basically an admission that their policy's costs exceed benefits.

Re: The Trouble with Public Choice: Too Generous to Politicians

TGGP — Thu, 27 Aug 2009 15:52:41 -0000

Costly signals are not incompatible with rational choice. Being costly does not means that costs exceed benefits (on an individual basis). If they did, nobody would engage in them! Robin actually believes that when costs for some forms of "irrationality" like overconfidence exceed benefits, we act more rationally.