DISQUS

There's definitely an aggressive sect of the antitrust community that would jump on any new media merger at this point. The FTC in particular has been trying to rewrite the "rules" of merger review to enable intervention in the narrowest of "markets." The DOJ has been more cautious in recent years, but that will change come January with the next administration (regardless of whether it's McCain or Obama.)

"But search ads will be supplanted by some higher-profit venture tomorrow."

Ah, but antitrust regulators aren't smart enough to know that -- otherwise they'd be working in the industry themselves. The regulators take a static snapshot and use that as a baseline, which inherently makes any change suspect.

"A company may have lots of market share at any particular time slice, but it always has to be looking out for the next tiny startup (like Microsoft or Google once were) to pop out of nowhere and destroy it."

This applies to antitrust as well. Regulators are always looking for the next big theory of antitrust liability -- especially under Section 2 of the Sherman Act -- that will give them unfettered control of the market.

"Are New York, and the nation, ready for the first blind governor?"



David Paterson is described as "legally blind." So how blind is he?

Your question is poorly framed. The state cannot prevent bad homeschooling--it can only force the institutionalization of the child in a state-sanctioned school, which itself is a form of child abuse and neglect.

If there's litigation, it couldn't take place until after the Democratic convention, since the credentials committee would have to vote not to seat the disputed Michigan and Florida delegations. The Clintons are certainly capable of such an act, but I suspect enough superdelegates would switch their allegiance to Obama to make the difference irrelevant.



The real disaster scenario is a walkout by the Clinton or Obama delegates and the staging of separate conventions. There's historical precedent (i.e. the "Dixiecrats" in 1948.) That would cause litigation over which convention was legitimate. It would also guarantee a McCain victory, but nobody ever said Democrats weren't self-destructive.

I disagree that McCain will or has to pick Huckabee. The fact that no other religious conservative made a dent in the primaries demonstrates how weak that constituency group is right now. They don't need to be appeased. Furthermore, Huckabee would be a wash -- just as many conservatives dislike him for his high-tax, high-regulation policies as like him for his theocractic tendencies.



If McCain were in the same position as the elder Bush in 1988, Huckabee might make sense. But he's closer to Dole in 1996 -- a likely one term president who needs a credible "mainstream" running mate who can serve as the nominee in 2012. Huckabee's a poor choice by this standard.




As for the Democrats, the majority of superdelegates will break for the candidate that best appeases the party's main constituency group -- public sector unions. I'm not sure whether this benefits Clinton or Obama more, but my instinct is to go with Clinton. Obama needs to take a decisive lead in the primary delegates to trigger an avalanche of superdelegates away from Clinton. (Which I think he can and expect he will.)




As for Obama's running mate, I think Bill Richardson is the most logical selection.

I believe the IRS plans to post the form sometime this month. At least that's what the evildoers told me.

I would add that the only function of the "per se" rule is to deprive defendants in antitrust cases of due process. The Supreme Court invented per se to prevent defendants from arguing that an antitrust rule was not supported by economics (or even logic.) Thus, a defendant cannot present a defense of any sort. The case now before the court would, at best, substitute a "rule of reason" standard that, while far from permitting actual reason to prevail, would at least permit defendants to argue their actions were economically beneficial.

Regarding the "price gouging" law, I suspect the main reason FTC Chairman Majoras is opposed is that it would destroy her agency's "business model" as it were. The FTC thrives on bullying firms into complying with fairly narrow antitrust regulations. Often, the FTC targets small businessmen and sole proprietors (in contrast to the populist myth that antitrust is about "big business.") Even large firms tend to be targeted over minor matters. Only a handful of FTC cases are litigated, and even fewer fall outside the agency's carefully choreographed administrative process.



A "price gouging" law would disturb the balance. Large oil companies and gas retailers will fight the FTC every step in the way in every court that's available. Majoras's staff would have to devote a disproportionate share of resources to a cause that probably has little chance of success in the courts.

James -- Your point about the dangers of industry-specific regulation is well taken. But I continue to be amazed at your defense of the FTC and antitrust. If there's "actual economics" going on at the FTC, I haven't seen it. All I've seen is a bunch of individuals and businesses who've been ruined by vindictive Bureau of Competition staffers. (If there's anything productive about the FTC, it's at the non-antitrust Bureau of Consumer Protection.)

And how exactly is "consumer welfare" a better standard than "public interest"? Frankly, most FTC cases I've seen use those two phrases interchangeably. The problem is "consumers" in the FTC's mind can mean large insurance companies, while the "criminals" are individual physicians or even self-employed management consultants who violate the FTC's mysterious and vague rules.

My real point here is not that the FTC is better or worse than the FCC. There's subjective value at work here. If you're the one getting screwed by the FTC, the FCC's abuses are irrelevant, and vice versa. But I have a real problem with this half-assed attempt to rationalize antitrust regulation--such as calling it "actual economics"--simply to make the FCC look worse by comparison.

Well, I could be convinced that the FCC is worse than the FCC, but I dispute this statement:

"Also, the FTC is willing to examine problems after the fact and not engage in preemptive regulation of industry behavior of market structures."

That's absolutely false. I've documented a number of industries where the FTC has engaged in preemptive regulation, health care being at the top of the list. The FTC has long forbidden various market structures for physician and hospital groups--based on no empirical evidence--and violated every norm of due process to enforce its views.

If you want an example of technology markets, just look at the FTC's long-running litigation against Rambus. There, the Commission is trying to assert control over patent policy and usurp the roles of not just the patent system but the Article III courts themselves. The result has been a litigation disaster that's enriched many lawyers at the expense of all industry participants. And Rambus is a case where the FTC definitely regulated first and asked questions . . . well, never.

Also, Gattuso's claim that we can "apply the same antitrust rules that apply to everyone else" is false and misleading. The very nature of antitrust is that different rules are applied differently based solely on the political judgment of regulators. If anything, it would be better for the FCC to simply make up a bunch of "neutrality" rules and enforce them semi-consistently than to give lawyers a total free hand in manufacturing antitrust claims after-the-fact.

How does further empowering the FTC, an agency with a long history of prosecutorial abuse, economic ignorance, and a violent opposition to private property rights constitute a good thing?

It's amusing, however, that today's Post contains a long article bemoaning the lack of more state regulation over food safety. Apparently cartels are bad when it comes to prices, but not in other areas.

It's worth noting that this film was financed with a "grant" AAI obtained from a court settlement in one of the vitamin "price fixing" settlements. It's common in class-action cases to bypass the alleged "victims" and distribute funds directly to pro-antitrust groups and academics.