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4 months ago
in Tyler Cowen Fans on Will Wilkinson
I'm very disappointed to learn from that link that Wendy Shalit was a philosophy major at Williams. I suspect that many of the Williams philosophy faculty are disappointed by that, too.
5 months ago
in Jurisdiculous on Will Wilkinson
Given that personal property rights are all parasitic on the laws of states, doesn't this same problem, if you think it's one, flow down to claims about personal property? You can only live where you do because the land was stolen from the Indians, so if the US didn't have rightful title to it, how can you?
show all 3 replies
3 replies
Will Wilkinson
I'd think so. I've always wondered why property-focused natural rights-type libertarians don't act like this is more of a serious problem for them.
Who dat?
"Given that personal property rights are all parasitic on the laws of states"
Personal property rights, in the form of owning one's own body, owning the food which one gathered, owning tools, owning a dwelling, owning a cornfield, owning a fishing weir or hunting stand, etc., existed for millenia before any state existed. It is the state which lives parasitically off of personal property rights, not the other way around.
Mind you, those who live in the belly of the state will tell you with a straight face that you owe everything them. It is not good for the business of being a parasite, to let one's true occupation be known.
Personal property rights, in the form of owning one's own body, owning the food which one gathered, owning tools, owning a dwelling, owning a cornfield, owning a fishing weir or hunting stand, etc., existed for millenia before any state existed. It is the state which lives parasitically off of personal property rights, not the other way around.
Mind you, those who live in the belly of the state will tell you with a straight face that you owe everything them. It is not good for the business of being a parasite, to let one's true occupation be known.
AnotherBen
As a legal matter, in common law jurisdictions, the person in possession of property will, after a certain length of time, be recognized as the owner, even if there originally was a problem with their claim. The legal issue of the taking of the land from the Indians is also more complex. This doesn't go to the philosophical question, unless that question is predicated on the law as it actually exists.
6 months ago
in Nothing to Do With Quarterbacks on Will Wilkinson
This is more typical Gladwell nonsense, even on the quarterback part. It's true that success in college football doesn't mean, necessarily, success in pro football. But the reasons for this are often quite clear. Pro football players are, at all positions, faster, stronger, and bigger than college players. This means that quarterbacks will almost always have to be faster, stronger, and bigger, too. You can get by, or even be very good, in college football as a quarterback a 6' or even a bit less, but that's almost never true in the pros, because there are so many taller players that the shorter quarterbacks can't see down field as well or throw over people as well. Something similar applies for arm strength, not getting hurt, etc. These factors are, in fact, really pretty predictable, and explain quite a bit of why a quarterback might not be successful in the pros while very good in college. He's a guy who makes a living writing about things he doesn't really know about. I just wish people would stop reading him.
7 months ago
in Canada’s Leading Public Intellectual on Will Wilkinson
I see. Poor Igantieff. He supports torture (but only when needed, on really bad guys!) and still can't be more than the 3rd (or 2nd, depending on how we count Pinker) public intellectual from Canada, and probably won't get to lead the Liberal party, either.
7 months ago
in Canada’s Leading Public Intellectual on Will Wilkinson
I've never read Klein (maybe an article in _The Nation_ but I'm not sure) and think I'd probably find her a bit annoying. But isn't Michael Ignatieff Canada's "leading public intellectual"? (I'm not super keen in Ignatieff, either, though for different reasons.
2 replies
Lemon
Michael Ignatieff was really only a public intellectual when he was living in England or the U.S. He has since returned to Canada and is now the leading candidate for the leadership of the Liberal Party of Canada - abandoning his intellectualism and his intellectual honesty in the process.
7 months ago
in Bop: More Utopia Tennis on Will Wilkinson
Like John, I was going to point out that the poison analogy isn't very good since lots of things that are poisonous in big doses are quite fine, even good for you, in smaller doses- most vitamins, red wine, acetaminophen, etc. Of course having a bad analogy doesn't itself make the argument wrong, but since it seems that many things are good in some dose but bad in much bigger ones is a general fact in life that he's going to need to think of a different sort of argument.
8 months ago
in Equal Chances for Equal Talent on Will Wilkinson
Will, doesn't the quoted part say, "...equal chances to obtain desirable positions..."? But in your example each person _has_ obtained a desirable position. (I don't know if they had equal chances to do so or not- leave that aside for a second- but they have obtained desirable positions, ones they in fact desired, even.) It would be a stupid view that required each person to have an equal chance to obtain any particular desired position, but that's not what Rawls's view requires. It seems to me that your remarks here are more or less a non sequitur and just miss the point of fair equality of opportunity.
1 reply
Luis
Bingo. There are lots of issues with Rawls, but Rawls isn't saying here 'for any given desirable position, everyone on earth must have the same exact opportunity to obtain that one given desirable position'; he's saying 'everyone should have similar opportunities to reach similarly desirable ends.' Both Robert and Sudeep have had the ability to achieve desirable ends and have done so; Rawls (in that example) would seemingly be satisfied.
Now, you've still got a point that this is unattainable in practice (Anne and Betty will always have some differentiation as a result of network and just plain luck) but it doesn't seem like a bad goal to be striven for within reasonable constraints.
Now, you've still got a point that this is unattainable in practice (Anne and Betty will always have some differentiation as a result of network and just plain luck) but it doesn't seem like a bad goal to be striven for within reasonable constraints.
9 months ago
in An Experiment on Will Wilkinson
I think that, rather than the terms themselves, you should write posts about the _lines_ of terms. So, you'd write an "Naomi Klein Mormon" post and an "My partner Ayn Rand sex" post. Mostly I just want to write the second one because it would be funny.
10 months ago
in Debating Global Warming Policy on Will Wilkinson
Not being qualified to talk about global warming policy I won't say anything about that. But, I do know an good haircut when I see one and I really think, Will, that you should go back to the short haircut. Maybe now that you're out in middle America you think you need the young republican who's been to busy to get to the barber for a few months look but I think we all, including you, will be happier if you go back to the shorter look. I know I always am happier when I do so, even though it's usually sloth that keeps me from keeping my own hair from looking good.
10 months ago
in David Gordon on Rawls on Will Wilkinson
"To assume that the institutions of property as they stand are already-justified constraints on any subsequent reform seems question-begging."
I agree with this completely, but it's important to see that even Nozick agreed with this- property rights are just on his account only if they develop in just ways from just original acquisitions, and only a fool thinks that is true of current property rights. So, even on Nozick's account we can't just start from the institution of property as it stands. (What we're supposed to do on Nozick's account is even less clear than on other accounts, just one reason why, as even he came to see, the theory in A,S&U really is a non-starter.)
I agree with this completely, but it's important to see that even Nozick agreed with this- property rights are just on his account only if they develop in just ways from just original acquisitions, and only a fool thinks that is true of current property rights. So, even on Nozick's account we can't just start from the institution of property as it stands. (What we're supposed to do on Nozick's account is even less clear than on other accounts, just one reason why, as even he came to see, the theory in A,S&U really is a non-starter.)
11 months ago
in Update! on Will Wilkinson
I was quite confused by your second-to-last sentence for a while, taking it to mean that you'd first move to Iowa city, where Kerry would work on and MFA, and then you'd also work on an MFA (exactly the same thing) but you'd do it from a different place (than Iowa City.) That seemed to not make any sense at all. After a minute I figured it out, though. Good luck w/ the move, though. I hope you get some cheap books at the liberty fund thing.
11 months ago
in Morally Bogus Debates on Will Wilkinson
The book idea sounds interesting, Will. I'll look forward to seeing it. I'd love to see the work-up for it when you have it together. I don't think I heard from you what you thought of John Gray's book on Hayek. I'd be curious to know what you thought.
1 reply
Will Wilkinson
Matt, It's been awhile since I read Gray on Hayek, so I'll have to revisit it and get back to you.
And by the way, I'm cartooning my own book idea, which is largely about the new sentimentalist literature in moral psychology and what it tells us about what is distinctive in liberal moral personality and moral culture. The stuff about globalism and mobility is meant to reinforce how the liberal taste for fairness, equality, and a distaste for coalitional exclusion has a lot of room to grow.
And by the way, I'm cartooning my own book idea, which is largely about the new sentimentalist literature in moral psychology and what it tells us about what is distinctive in liberal moral personality and moral culture. The stuff about globalism and mobility is meant to reinforce how the liberal taste for fairness, equality, and a distaste for coalitional exclusion has a lot of room to grow.
11 months ago
in Morally Bogus Debates on Will Wilkinson
The short answer I'd give, Will (the long answer is in the dissertation I'm trying to finish now!) is that social cooperation is essential to good lives, but that social cooperation isn't possible in a world like ours without political cooperation. (In a very different world it might be but that world is enough unlike ours that we don't really need to consider it much.) But then, for political cooperation to be possible we have to draw bounded territories. But this in turn includes the right to exclude. That right isn't absolute, of course, but it does rule out a general right to free movement between states. Since a general right to free movement between states is also not necessary for equal respect or for living a decent right this right to exclude is not over-ruled by more pressing rights. Reports have it that even Joseph Carens, the philosophical father of the idea that free movement is a human right, has come around to this view in his recent work. I think it's pretty powerful and don't see how the other.
You might check out Joseph Heath's excellent paper here:
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/%7Ejheath/multicul...
Heath tells me he's moved away from the Dworkinian machinery (rightly, I think) in the paper to a more Rawlsian one but the same argument works, I think. It's best when read with this other very good paper of his:
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/%7Ejheath/rawls.pdf
Anyway, I hope that's helpful.
You might check out Joseph Heath's excellent paper here:
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/%7Ejheath/multicul...
Heath tells me he's moved away from the Dworkinian machinery (rightly, I think) in the paper to a more Rawlsian one but the same argument works, I think. It's best when read with this other very good paper of his:
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/%7Ejheath/rawls.pdf
Anyway, I hope that's helpful.
1 reply
Will Wilkinson
Matt, I agree that the kind of social cooperation we want often needs political cooperation to enable to production of public goods that facilitate social cooperation. And I agree the jurisdictions for public goods need to be geographically bounded. And I agree that in order for the administrative authorities to provide the goods (that justify their existence ) in their jurisdictions, they may need to regulate entry into the jurisdiction. So far, we're more or less on the same page. But I find the idea that a basic (but like most rights defeasible under certain conditions) human right to move over the Earth is not necessary for the minimal respect each person is due very hard to swallow. Indeed, I think mobility rights create a check on state power that helps ensure that people within states have other their rights respected in addition to helping ensure people have a decent material minimum. That is, mobility rights are necessary for other economic and political rights to have fair value. So here's our debate.
That's me putting it into quasi-Rawlsian language. But I think a lot of our disagreement will have to do with the difference between my (to you probably deflationary) conception of states as monopoly providers of certain necessary public goods, and what I take to be your more Rawlsian sense of states as sites of democratic activity and democratic activity as important to human dignity in a way that completely eludes me.
I'm working on a book proposal about the psychology and authority of liberal moral sensibilities, and after arguing that conservatives really are more or less backwards, I intend to argue that liberalism really does requires a kind of Mises-Hayek kind of global federalism, and that contemporary welfare state liberals and social democrats are illiberal (standing athwart history yelling stop) insofar as they stand in the way of this. So this is a debate I really appreciate having. (As opposed to the debate with a lot of conservatives, who generally don't see the need to justify the exclusion.) I look forward to these papers and your dissertation. Thanks again for all the helpful pointers.
That's me putting it into quasi-Rawlsian language. But I think a lot of our disagreement will have to do with the difference between my (to you probably deflationary) conception of states as monopoly providers of certain necessary public goods, and what I take to be your more Rawlsian sense of states as sites of democratic activity and democratic activity as important to human dignity in a way that completely eludes me.
I'm working on a book proposal about the psychology and authority of liberal moral sensibilities, and after arguing that conservatives really are more or less backwards, I intend to argue that liberalism really does requires a kind of Mises-Hayek kind of global federalism, and that contemporary welfare state liberals and social democrats are illiberal (standing athwart history yelling stop) insofar as they stand in the way of this. So this is a debate I really appreciate having. (As opposed to the debate with a lot of conservatives, who generally don't see the need to justify the exclusion.) I look forward to these papers and your dissertation. Thanks again for all the helpful pointers.
11 months ago
in Morally Bogus Debates on Will Wilkinson
Doesn't it seem, though, Will, that state borders can be as porous as they are because national borders are stronger? That seems to be so to me. Consider the EU- as the internal barriers to trade and movement have come down a new federal system of laws and much stronger external borders have come into existence. So, you'll need a lot more steps in your argument before you can just say national borders should be like U.S. state borders.
I'm curious, too, why you think free movement in the sense you have in mind is a basic right. It seems more plausible to me that it's instrumentally valuable- we think it's important because it makes the fulfillment of other important rights easier, but it can be restricted when it conflicts with other things we value. (Take the most obvious case- the right to free movement doesn't mean you can go into my house if you want to.) So you'll need a substantive argument as to why movement _between countries_ outweighs other values, such as democratic self determination. I think that can be outweighed in some cases, but you need a substantial argument and not just an invocation of a supposedly basic right to free movement.
I'm curious, too, why you think free movement in the sense you have in mind is a basic right. It seems more plausible to me that it's instrumentally valuable- we think it's important because it makes the fulfillment of other important rights easier, but it can be restricted when it conflicts with other things we value. (Take the most obvious case- the right to free movement doesn't mean you can go into my house if you want to.) So you'll need a substantive argument as to why movement _between countries_ outweighs other values, such as democratic self determination. I think that can be outweighed in some cases, but you need a substantial argument and not just an invocation of a supposedly basic right to free movement.
11 months ago
in Oh, You Didn’t Want to Decrease Inequality That Way? on Will Wilkinson
Hi Will- for some reason I thought the linked bit was just a teaser for a longer piece you actually did. I'm sure you'd have said more if you had time so sorry on that confusion on my part.
Lots of trade restrictions can be formally represented as subsidies but they behave differently in real life (produce different kinds of distortions or trade diversion, etc.) which is why all the trade literature (at least done by anyone who bothers to actually learn something about trade beyond pure theory!) thinks it's important to treat them differently and that some forms are better than others. If they were truly completely equivalent that wouldn't be so.
Thomas Pogge has a pretty good paper arguing that increased immigration openness is really a pretty bad way to decrease global inequality. I'd quibble with many of his points but I think it's mostly right. (I don't often agree with Pogge but think this is one of his better papers.) You can find it several places but perhaps most easily in the 2nd edition of the volume edited by Goodin and Pettit, _Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology_.
Gabriel- I'm curious why you say tariffs are taxes paid "directly to a supplier". That's not how they work unless you're just saying something unclear. The money from a tariff doesn't go to the supplier at all. (I'm not sure who you mean by "supplier" here, either.) Importers, who may or may not be manufacturers, pay tariffs. The cost of the tariff may or may not be reflected in the price for various reasons though of course usually it will. But the money from the tariff doesn't go to the domestic suppliers or anyone like that, at least any more than to all of us. In fact, a scheme like that was tried on a few tariffs (officially "anti-dumping and countervailing duties") and it was declared to be against WTO rules on no uncertain terms, had to be stopped, and allowed other countries to put in place countervailing duties until the practice ended. This was done because such a plan constituted a non-allowed subsidy. (This is one way to see how subsidies and tariffs can differ greatly in practice.)
Lots of trade restrictions can be formally represented as subsidies but they behave differently in real life (produce different kinds of distortions or trade diversion, etc.) which is why all the trade literature (at least done by anyone who bothers to actually learn something about trade beyond pure theory!) thinks it's important to treat them differently and that some forms are better than others. If they were truly completely equivalent that wouldn't be so.
Thomas Pogge has a pretty good paper arguing that increased immigration openness is really a pretty bad way to decrease global inequality. I'd quibble with many of his points but I think it's mostly right. (I don't often agree with Pogge but think this is one of his better papers.) You can find it several places but perhaps most easily in the 2nd edition of the volume edited by Goodin and Pettit, _Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology_.
Gabriel- I'm curious why you say tariffs are taxes paid "directly to a supplier". That's not how they work unless you're just saying something unclear. The money from a tariff doesn't go to the supplier at all. (I'm not sure who you mean by "supplier" here, either.) Importers, who may or may not be manufacturers, pay tariffs. The cost of the tariff may or may not be reflected in the price for various reasons though of course usually it will. But the money from the tariff doesn't go to the domestic suppliers or anyone like that, at least any more than to all of us. In fact, a scheme like that was tried on a few tariffs (officially "anti-dumping and countervailing duties") and it was declared to be against WTO rules on no uncertain terms, had to be stopped, and allowed other countries to put in place countervailing duties until the practice ended. This was done because such a plan constituted a non-allowed subsidy. (This is one way to see how subsidies and tariffs can differ greatly in practice.)
11 months ago
in Oh, You Didn’t Want to Decrease Inequality That Way? on Will Wilkinson
I wonder if it's quite right (expect perhaps as a rhetorical move) to call limits on H1B visas a "subsidy". People working on trade make several distinctions between ways trade can be limited or distorted and it's generally thought to be important to make a distinction between subsidies of various sorts (production subsidies, export subsidies, etc.), tariffs, quotas, and other "non-tariff barriers to trade". Now, in some sense we might be able to re-define all of these as subsidies of one sort or another but I'm not sure that's actually useful. From an analytical perspective that would be useful if we thought they all more or less had the same sort of effect, but it doesn't seem that that's the case. There are reasons, for example, that economists think it's better for states, if they are going to have barriers to trade, to have tariffs rather than non-tariff barriers of various sorts. (Some of the reasons, but only some, are related to transparency.) Given these sort of concerns I'd want to see more before concluding that it's useful (except as a rhetorical move) to say that numerical limits on H1B visas are usefully considered to be subsidies. (Perhaps you say more in the actual radio show- I can't listen to it now so am just going by the printed bits above and in the link.)
Also, it seems to me that the argument only works if you assume open borders as the base-line. That might be right but it's certainly not obvious. If we instead took no employment-based immigration as the baseline then we get a completely different answer as to whether this is a subsidy or not- it rather ends up looking like a tax on certain skilled workers for the benefit of others. I don't think that's the right baseline, either, but it's no less implausible as a start and more needs to be done to justify one or the other. In this way immigration restrictions again seems somewhat different from agriculture subsidies to me.
Also, it seems to me that the argument only works if you assume open borders as the base-line. That might be right but it's certainly not obvious. If we instead took no employment-based immigration as the baseline then we get a completely different answer as to whether this is a subsidy or not- it rather ends up looking like a tax on certain skilled workers for the benefit of others. I don't think that's the right baseline, either, but it's no less implausible as a start and more needs to be done to justify one or the other. In this way immigration restrictions again seems somewhat different from agriculture subsidies to me.
11 months ago
in New on Free Will: Bruce Caldwell on Hayek on Will Wilkinson
Will- have you read John Gray's book on Hayek? I liked it a lot but would be interested to know what you thought. (I must say I'm sympathetic to many of the criticisms Gray adds in the later editions though not where he then takes them.)
12 months ago
in Two View on Luck and Redistribution on Will Wilkinson
DJW- if you're still around email me (I don't have your email) and I'll send you Tan's paper. You can get my email via the link in my name.
12 months ago
in Regrettable Prudence on Will Wilkinson
Seneca says somewhere (one of his letters, I think) that everything should be done in moderation, including over-indulgence. That's not quite the same thing the article seems to be on to, but an important truth along the same lines, I think.
1 year ago
in Two View on Luck and Redistribution on Will Wilkinson
I'll see if I can get a copy of Tan's paper for you. (I read it a while ago but don't think I have a copy any more- I'll see him this weekend and will ask him to send me a copy. ) I hope Freeman's book will be out in paper-back before too long. The racket of keeping things in hardback for a terribly long time is awful, I think. It's beyond me how it's profitable for the publishers, even, but I guess they'd know better than I do. (I'd be happy to mail you a physical copy if you email me an address.)
1 year ago
in Two View on Luck and Redistribution on Will Wilkinson
It's very common to read Rawls as a sort of luck egalitarian, based mostly on taking a few bits out of context, but it seems to me that the better readings show that this isn't right. For good arguments to this end see Samuel Scheffler's excellent paper "What is Egalitarianism" in Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (Winter 2003), and, especially, Samuel Freeman's "Rawls and Luck Egalitarianism" in his _Justice and the Social Contract_. The best defense of luck egalitarianism that I've seen will be out soon (I hope!) in the Journal of Philosophy by KC Tan. I still think it's wrong, for reasons like those you give above, but it's the best I've seen. Also, most luck egalitarians are cosmopolitans so that bit in your argument is wrong, I think. Finally, while some really hard-core luck egalitarians hold as strong of a view as you present here (Larry Temkin is the best example- a truly crazy view), most hold more modest views that distinguish between what is and what is not properly attributable to luck (though often not in very compelling ways, I think.) The classic example here might be Dworkin in _Sovereign Virtue_.
1 year ago
in Return Migration on Will Wilkinson
Let me recommend again, as I did in another tread, Saskia Sassen's book _Guests and Aliens_. It's more about migration in Europe than to and from the US but also covers that to some degree. It's a bit old now but still very useful and is an excellent book on this subject. It's important not to over-state the case. About 30% of Italians and the like who moved to the US eventually returned to Italy. That's a lot and a lot more than Americans usually think, but it's obviously also a pretty clear minority. The particular features of different migrations also need to be kept in mind when trying to say what will happen in any given case. But, what most people "know" about the subject is mostly made up. Sassen's book is a good place to start.
1 year ago
in Clark on Polanyi (the Bad One) on Will Wilkinson
The review might be "fun" but it's not very accurate at summarizing Polanyi and so not very good at critiquing him, either. It's bad enough to make me wonder if he'd really read the book or just was going on what he'd read elsewhere. The claim that Polanyi is ignored by economists is also very odd- I was turned on to the book by my first econ professor in college who was a big fan. Brad Delong assigns him, Stilglitz wrote the introduction to the new version, etc. It's a weird review, based much more on a particular ideological take than a real effort to look at the book. I guess that can be "fun" but it's not very enlightening.
1 year ago
in Milton Friedman’s Argument for Illegal Immigration on Will Wilkinson
"What do you think of 2nd Gen birthright idea?"
I don't see how it can be justified to categorically refuse citizenship to those born in the country because of who their parents are. (All sorts of small modifications can be made though they may be hard enough to administrate as to make them not worth it.) Children of immigrants enter society just as children of citizens do, it seems to me. Would you think it acceptable for the best off to negotiate with the worst off citizens now, to give them higher benefits in exchange for their children not being citizens and so not eligible for welfare benefits? What if we also cut a deal w/ Angola so that these non-citizens could go there if they wanted? I'd think that would be clearly unacceptable since parents cannot bargain away the rights of their children. But the children of immigrants are in the same situation. It would be small consolation for the children of immigrants that their grandchildren could be citizens.
(The sorts of modifications we might try, if they didn't prove to be too expensive to administrate, would be things like the 'conditional' birthright citizenship found in Germany where those who have citizenship in another country via their parents must choose at 18 which they will keep, or a program where, if someone would also have citizenship in another country, she must 'avail' herself of the laws of the US for some time before turning 18 to retain citizenship. This would prevent citizenship from being granted to people who had no connection to the US except being born there, though it might be too costly in intrusiveness and investigation costs to enforce.)
I don't see how it can be justified to categorically refuse citizenship to those born in the country because of who their parents are. (All sorts of small modifications can be made though they may be hard enough to administrate as to make them not worth it.) Children of immigrants enter society just as children of citizens do, it seems to me. Would you think it acceptable for the best off to negotiate with the worst off citizens now, to give them higher benefits in exchange for their children not being citizens and so not eligible for welfare benefits? What if we also cut a deal w/ Angola so that these non-citizens could go there if they wanted? I'd think that would be clearly unacceptable since parents cannot bargain away the rights of their children. But the children of immigrants are in the same situation. It would be small consolation for the children of immigrants that their grandchildren could be citizens.
(The sorts of modifications we might try, if they didn't prove to be too expensive to administrate, would be things like the 'conditional' birthright citizenship found in Germany where those who have citizenship in another country via their parents must choose at 18 which they will keep, or a program where, if someone would also have citizenship in another country, she must 'avail' herself of the laws of the US for some time before turning 18 to retain citizenship. This would prevent citizenship from being granted to people who had no connection to the US except being born there, though it might be too costly in intrusiveness and investigation costs to enforce.)
1 year ago
in Milton Friedman’s Argument for Illegal Immigration on Will Wilkinson
I'm not assuming that most immigrants want to stay here. (This is my main area of research and I know it fairly well.) Circular immigration is very common and often has been. (See Saskia Sassen's _Guests and Aliens_ for an excellent account of this.) But, some will stay and some of their children will stay. (This clearly happened in Germany, after all- it's not like people who say this are just making it up.) But the situation in Germany, where the children of guest-workers were born into the country, lived there, grew up there, and were in all important senses German but were unable to fully take part in society seems to me a pretty clearly unjust one and one that certainly cannot be justified on any plausible contractarian grounds. W/o birthright citizenship in some form that would happen here, too. You don't have to think "most" immigrants would stay to think that would be a moral disaster. (And of course if most don't stay then granting birthright citizenship isn't as costly as some might think, either.)
