Hello!
The comments on this profile are unclaimed and thus are unverified.
Do they belong to you? Claim these comments.
Freddie
Is this you? Claim Profile »
1 week ago
in Is Poverty a Violation of Human Rights? on Will Wilkinson
Again, you're simply not engaging the question at hand. Whether or not gay marriage is immoral is irrelevant to the question at hand, which is the proper situating of morality talk and rights talk in this context. As usual, you're far better at criticizing than you are at offering anything resembling a workable argument. Even if I felt that gay marriage was even remotely analogous to rape in any logical way, your post would be flatly unworkable as a statement of practical politics. The clear suggestion from what you've said, after all, is that if you don't believe in a moral duty to prevent gay marriage, there isn't a moral obligation to prevent rape. Which is nonsense, as well you know. But you rest assured in the idea that you can say it's about me-- not you, me!-- and not bother to generate internally consistent arguments. Which is consistent with your general behavior, which is to try and snipe and snark, but prove utterly unable to present a coherent argument of your own when called to the canvas.
And listen, slick, it doesn't take psychoanalyzing to call bullshit on bullshit.
And listen, slick, it doesn't take psychoanalyzing to call bullshit on bullshit.
1 reply
1 week ago
in Is Poverty a Violation of Human Rights? on Will Wilkinson
It's not different; it's a complete non sequitur. You're talking about disputes regarding what is and isn't moral, which, while interesting, and a big part of our political dialogue, has nothing to do with what we're talking about here. So why do you bring it up? Because you have this never-ceasing tendency to want to drop some irrelevant gotcha on me. I'm not interested in disputing whether gay marriage or whatever else is moral, and you know very well my opinion on that question. We're talking about the consequences of moral talk and positive rights.
If you want to talk like a grownup, I'm all for it, but when you constantly leap back and forth between your serious foot and your troll foot, it's tiring, and I'm not inclined to participate.
If you want to talk like a grownup, I'm all for it, but when you constantly leap back and forth between your serious foot and your troll foot, it's tiring, and I'm not inclined to participate.
1 reply
Jaybird
As much as I appreciate the free psychoanalysis, I'd more like to get back to the topic at hand... which is the whole is this paragraph something that ought to be used before we have the government do something or not?
Here, I'll post the paragraph again:
"But what alternative? People need little excuse to abdicate any moral obligation at all. What if the choice is piety or apathy? I'll take piety, thanks. And I don't think that the fact that something is impossible means we have no obligation to pursue it. In fact, I think impossible pursuits are some of our most important."
Now, when I read that paragraph, my eyes widen and I think about the huge number of things that it can, and has, been used to justify.
I'll ask you directly:
What makes your use of this particular paragraph different?
The follow-up question would be this: how in the hell can you *NOT* talk about what is moral when you (You, Freddie, not me... you.) bring up the importance of, let me quote this word to you, "piety" when it comes to social action?
Here, I'll post the paragraph again:
"But what alternative? People need little excuse to abdicate any moral obligation at all. What if the choice is piety or apathy? I'll take piety, thanks. And I don't think that the fact that something is impossible means we have no obligation to pursue it. In fact, I think impossible pursuits are some of our most important."
Now, when I read that paragraph, my eyes widen and I think about the huge number of things that it can, and has, been used to justify.
I'll ask you directly:
What makes your use of this particular paragraph different?
The follow-up question would be this: how in the hell can you *NOT* talk about what is moral when you (You, Freddie, not me... you.) bring up the importance of, let me quote this word to you, "piety" when it comes to social action?
1 week ago
in Is Poverty a Violation of Human Rights? on Will Wilkinson
But what alternative? People need little excuse to abdicate any moral obligation at all. What if the choice is piety or apathy? I'll take piety, thanks. And I don't think that the fact that something is impossible means we have no obligation to pursue it. In fact, I think impossible pursuits are some of our most important.
show all 3 replies
3 replies
TGGP
I'm an enthusiast for apathy, I think we rarely get to hear its case made.
When I hear people talk about reaching for impossible dreams, I reach for my gun. But I reach for my gun for any damn reason.
When I hear people talk about reaching for impossible dreams, I reach for my gun. But I reach for my gun for any damn reason.
Jaybird
I could see this particular speech prefacing a whole mess of initiatives.
Holding signs in front of Planned Parenthood...
Explaining how marriage is between a man and a woman...
Explaining how obscene music and art needs to be banned...
Hey. You want to be amoral and apathetic and say that gays should be allowed to be married, that's fine. Those of us who are pious and understand Man's relationship with God's Creation can do the heavy lifting of keeping society intact against the seemingly inevitable tide of "progressivism". With the help of our lord and savior Jesus Christ, we will overcome.
Or would you say "that's different"?
Holding signs in front of Planned Parenthood...
Explaining how marriage is between a man and a woman...
Explaining how obscene music and art needs to be banned...
Hey. You want to be amoral and apathetic and say that gays should be allowed to be married, that's fine. Those of us who are pious and understand Man's relationship with God's Creation can do the heavy lifting of keeping society intact against the seemingly inevitable tide of "progressivism". With the help of our lord and savior Jesus Christ, we will overcome.
Or would you say "that's different"?
1 week ago
in Is Poverty a Violation of Human Rights? on Will Wilkinson
I don't disagree with your reasoning about human psychology. My worry is that this kind of thinking can excuse a refusal to discuss moral ends that don't have specific policy proposals attached to them. I think most everyone thinks that, for example, we have a moral duty to prevent rape; the fact that I can't articulate a policy proposal that could better achieve that end can't mean that I have to give up saying that I have such a duty. Can it?
2 replies
JMW
This post and comments thread seems to be well-intentioned, but all over the map. "We have a moral duty to prevent rape" is a perfect example. If you said, "I think most everyone thinks that we have a moral duty to strongly condemn rape" or even "to strongly condemn rape and work to educate the men most prone to it" that would be one thing. That's a moral position. But if I'm failing morally whenever someone is raped, it seems like we're adopting a pretty idealistic (dare I say adolescent?) vision of morality. How could we possibly fulfill that moral duty? We couldn't. A duty that is impossible to fulfill sounds less like a duty and more like a piety to me.
Neel Krishnaswami
You don't have to give it up -- you've got freedom of speech! But as a practical matter, it's up to us, not our audience, to craft effective, honest and persuasive messages.
This means it's up to us to take our speech communities into account. E.g., if we're among moral philosophers, they probably won't mind abstract moral reasoning -- they won't come in with the expectation that we're advancing a stalking-horse. OTOH, if we're starting a critical discussion with someone who disagrees with us but is reasonable, then ostentatiously engaging in practices that indicate good faith is sensible. Establishing a history of not being a jerk is what lets us deploy rhetorical moves that look similar to tricks jerks often use.
Of course, I'm not getting at your real point, which is to figure out the obligations that ideal listeners have towards a speaker. Partly, this is because I don't know what properties an ideal listener has! Do they have finite time and attention? If so, how much? Are they obliged to be rational? How hard do they have to work to understand our message? How much interpretive charity should they exercise? Even, are they obliged to listen at all? It seems like there are lots of sensible answers to all of these questions, with each combination of answers entailing different norms of discourse. So it seems like even in the ideal (as opposed to the practical), we have to pay attention to the norms of the particular community we're in, and adapt to that.
This means it's up to us to take our speech communities into account. E.g., if we're among moral philosophers, they probably won't mind abstract moral reasoning -- they won't come in with the expectation that we're advancing a stalking-horse. OTOH, if we're starting a critical discussion with someone who disagrees with us but is reasonable, then ostentatiously engaging in practices that indicate good faith is sensible. Establishing a history of not being a jerk is what lets us deploy rhetorical moves that look similar to tricks jerks often use.
Of course, I'm not getting at your real point, which is to figure out the obligations that ideal listeners have towards a speaker. Partly, this is because I don't know what properties an ideal listener has! Do they have finite time and attention? If so, how much? Are they obliged to be rational? How hard do they have to work to understand our message? How much interpretive charity should they exercise? Even, are they obliged to listen at all? It seems like there are lots of sensible answers to all of these questions, with each combination of answers entailing different norms of discourse. So it seems like even in the ideal (as opposed to the practical), we have to pay attention to the norms of the particular community we're in, and adapt to that.
1 week ago
in Is Poverty a Violation of Human Rights? on Will Wilkinson
You're overdoing it.
He's saying poverty is a natural state, which is germane only if he believes that the fact that it is a natural state suggests that there is no duty to change it, or no reason to prefer not-poverty to poverty. But my suggestion is that, commenting on a blog post as he is, he is unlikely to be in poverty, in the global sense. And so I am asking, if poverty is a natural state, and that fact means something for whether or not we should attempt to change it, does that then suggest that he has no particular right to remain outside of poverty? Or, that he has no right to not be put into poverty by outside action.
He's saying poverty is a natural state, which is germane only if he believes that the fact that it is a natural state suggests that there is no duty to change it, or no reason to prefer not-poverty to poverty. But my suggestion is that, commenting on a blog post as he is, he is unlikely to be in poverty, in the global sense. And so I am asking, if poverty is a natural state, and that fact means something for whether or not we should attempt to change it, does that then suggest that he has no particular right to remain outside of poverty? Or, that he has no right to not be put into poverty by outside action.
2 replies
Freddie
Overthinking it, that is.
Jaybird
"Or, that he has no right to not be put into poverty by outside action."
Perhaps he does, perhaps he does not.
When you say "outside action", I presume that you mean an action taken by someone else. Does this other person have the Right to take this action? Where does this Right come from?
Much of this seems to come from a deep intuition that "this is not the way the world ought to be" (an intuition I share, by the way) but that intuition seems to quite regularly lead to "Something Ought To Be Done!"... and that leads to "Therefore I Have (or someone like me has) The Right To Change It!"
I don't know that you can get there (outside action) from here... though I'd love to see how one does.
Perhaps he does, perhaps he does not.
When you say "outside action", I presume that you mean an action taken by someone else. Does this other person have the Right to take this action? Where does this Right come from?
Much of this seems to come from a deep intuition that "this is not the way the world ought to be" (an intuition I share, by the way) but that intuition seems to quite regularly lead to "Something Ought To Be Done!"... and that leads to "Therefore I Have (or someone like me has) The Right To Change It!"
I don't know that you can get there (outside action) from here... though I'd love to see how one does.
1 week ago
in Is Poverty a Violation of Human Rights? on Will Wilkinson
I agree with you, almost without exception, and I agree with your last paragraph entirely. I guess my first instinct is to say that this is really a question of enforceability-- Benin doesn't have the ability to enforce the rights of its people on the United States, in the redistributional sense. Though the United States certainly has the ability to enforce such rights against the wealthy of Benin.... And, internationalist that I am, I doubt if there will be a time when military inequality ever fades enough to make such enforcement possible. So I imagine the goal can only be consensus.
On health care, specifically, but in general as well, for now, I have this thing called the state; and I see a situation that I find morally untenable, and the only instrument I see to fix that currently is the state.
It's interesting, and depressing, the way that the discussion goes. I try to be upfront with the fact that, while I have ideas about what will work best and what won't, what remains is my moral intuition that the lack of health care for everyone is an obscenity, particularly in a society with such opulence. That moral obligation that I believe in (and I recognize that many don't) doesn't go away, even if I can't articulate a particularly effective plan to solve the problem. Just as my belief in the moral obligation to put out my neighbor's house when it's on fire doesn't disappear because I lack in-depth knowledge of fire-fighting.
But people are very, very resistant to morality talk that isn't an addendum to a policy position, for reasons I don't entirely understand. It helps, though, to remember the ultimate goal-- coverage for everyone. Any plan that satisfies that, that brings a minimum level of care to everyone, is a plan that I'll endorse. Which is why it was heartening to hear you say on bloggingheads that you'd just like the government to cut checks for people who need health care and can't afford it. If it gets people access to the health care they need, that satisfies me.
On health care, specifically, but in general as well, for now, I have this thing called the state; and I see a situation that I find morally untenable, and the only instrument I see to fix that currently is the state.
It's interesting, and depressing, the way that the discussion goes. I try to be upfront with the fact that, while I have ideas about what will work best and what won't, what remains is my moral intuition that the lack of health care for everyone is an obscenity, particularly in a society with such opulence. That moral obligation that I believe in (and I recognize that many don't) doesn't go away, even if I can't articulate a particularly effective plan to solve the problem. Just as my belief in the moral obligation to put out my neighbor's house when it's on fire doesn't disappear because I lack in-depth knowledge of fire-fighting.
But people are very, very resistant to morality talk that isn't an addendum to a policy position, for reasons I don't entirely understand. It helps, though, to remember the ultimate goal-- coverage for everyone. Any plan that satisfies that, that brings a minimum level of care to everyone, is a plan that I'll endorse. Which is why it was heartening to hear you say on bloggingheads that you'd just like the government to cut checks for people who need health care and can't afford it. If it gets people access to the health care they need, that satisfies me.
1 reply
Neel Krishnaswami
"But people are very, very resistant to morality talk that isn't an addendum to a policy position, for reasons I don't entirely understand."
It's pretty simple, actually. Morality talk, unmoored to a policy position, is often used as a form of dishonest rhetoric aimed at exploiting cognitive dissonance. The strategy works like this: make an abstract moral claim untied to any particular example, and then get the guy you're arguing with to agree that good people agree with that claim. Then, once they've agreed with your principle, you spring a specific policy on them, which a) they disagree with, and b) follows from your moral principle. At this point they have to either agree with you or admit they're bad people.
Unsurprisingly, this makes people very angry. (Really, the surprise is that the other Greeks took as long to poison Socrates as they did.) So of course when you just engage in moral talk, even the possibility that you're engaging in Socratic jackassery can lead people to tune you out right from the beginning. Laying down your policy cards up front means that you can't pull this style of gotcha on them, and so they are more likely to take your moral claims as good-faith arguments.
"It helps, though, to remember the ultimate goal-- coverage for everyone."
As an aside, no, this isn't the ultimate goal. The ultimate goal is good health for as many people as possible. Medicine and health care is a tool for maintaining good health; it's not an ultimate goal in and of itself.
Concretely, suppose you have the choice between two scenarios: in the first, most people biked to work and ate a healthy diet, but we had the same care than we do now. In the second, we leave car culture and diet unchanged, but transplanted the French health care system here (which is probably the world's best). We'd have better health outcomes than in the first, than the second, so we'd be morally obliged to pick the first. This means that morally speaking, full coverage can't be an end.
It's pretty simple, actually. Morality talk, unmoored to a policy position, is often used as a form of dishonest rhetoric aimed at exploiting cognitive dissonance. The strategy works like this: make an abstract moral claim untied to any particular example, and then get the guy you're arguing with to agree that good people agree with that claim. Then, once they've agreed with your principle, you spring a specific policy on them, which a) they disagree with, and b) follows from your moral principle. At this point they have to either agree with you or admit they're bad people.
Unsurprisingly, this makes people very angry. (Really, the surprise is that the other Greeks took as long to poison Socrates as they did.) So of course when you just engage in moral talk, even the possibility that you're engaging in Socratic jackassery can lead people to tune you out right from the beginning. Laying down your policy cards up front means that you can't pull this style of gotcha on them, and so they are more likely to take your moral claims as good-faith arguments.
"It helps, though, to remember the ultimate goal-- coverage for everyone."
As an aside, no, this isn't the ultimate goal. The ultimate goal is good health for as many people as possible. Medicine and health care is a tool for maintaining good health; it's not an ultimate goal in and of itself.
Concretely, suppose you have the choice between two scenarios: in the first, most people biked to work and ate a healthy diet, but we had the same care than we do now. In the second, we leave car culture and diet unchanged, but transplanted the French health care system here (which is probably the world's best). We'd have better health outcomes than in the first, than the second, so we'd be morally obliged to pick the first. This means that morally speaking, full coverage can't be an end.
1 week ago
in Is Poverty a Violation of Human Rights? on Will Wilkinson
The fact that you have access to an Internet connection and a computer functioning well enough to use it suggests (though doesn't prove) that, in a global-relative sense, you are not in poverty. You are, therefore, not acting in concert with the "natural state of man". My question for you is whether you think that you have any particular right to remain in that state, and if not, if you don't think there is something wrong with someone taking it away from you. Because the minute you assert that you have the right to not have that state changed, you are undermining the suggestion that there's nothing particularly improper about poverty.
1 reply
Jaybird
"Because the minute you assert that you have the right to not have that state changed, you are undermining the suggestion that there's nothing particularly improper about poverty."
I'd more wonder at the change of state... are you saying that you have the right to take a percentage of his stuff away, presumably to give it to someone much more in need than he is?
I'd not say that he has a right to stay in his state as much as question your right to change it... and if you don't have the right to change his state, who would? A bunch of people who got together, voted, and said "okay, we now can change his state"?
If I say something like "I have X" and you say "but you don't have the *RIGHT* to X"... then what? Do you have the right to X? Do you have the right to make sure that I don't have X? Do you have the right to make sure that no one has X?
Does this thought process work when you apply it to, say, abortion rights? Gay marriage?
I'd more wonder at the change of state... are you saying that you have the right to take a percentage of his stuff away, presumably to give it to someone much more in need than he is?
I'd not say that he has a right to stay in his state as much as question your right to change it... and if you don't have the right to change his state, who would? A bunch of people who got together, voted, and said "okay, we now can change his state"?
If I say something like "I have X" and you say "but you don't have the *RIGHT* to X"... then what? Do you have the right to X? Do you have the right to make sure that I don't have X? Do you have the right to make sure that no one has X?
Does this thought process work when you apply it to, say, abortion rights? Gay marriage?
2 weeks ago
in The Bailouts are Like Paying Off Molested Children on Will Wilkinson
As usual, I just find the definition of what constitutes unfairness here bizarre. We redistribute out of a desire to fix structural imbalances that unduly harm some. Of course, it doesn't always work out that way. Of course, money flows to special interest. Of course. It sucks. But to say "redistribution is unfair" in a country where the single most powerful correlative factor for whether you will be wealthy or poor is whether your parents were wealthy or poor is just strange moral logic to me. Unfair? I can see an argument where it is unfair to have your money taxed away from you. To think that this unfairness is equal or even comparable to the unfairness of being born into poverty and all of its attendant suffering just doesn't compute for me. A kid who grows up punishingly poor and hungry in a drug and crime-riddled inner city without the benefit of a stable family or proper socialization-- such a person knows about unfairness on a level that someone who feels overtaxed doesn't. I am not unsympathetic, at all, to people who feel robbed by taxes. But I can't imagine a reasonable perspective that imagines that to be anywhere near the top of our society's list of injustices. People arguing against redistribution as unfair have a rather narrow definition of fairness.
Here's where I can come on board with arguments to fairness: abolish inheritance. Then we can talk about fair.
Here's where I can come on board with arguments to fairness: abolish inheritance. Then we can talk about fair.
2 replies
Neel Krishnaswami
"We redistribute out of a desire to fix structural imbalances that unduly harm some."
"Fixing structural imbalances" is overwhelmingly unlikely to be the reason why most people support transfers. We can see that this, because when we make a list of things that promote structural inequality in the US -- such as the War on Drugs, the poor quality of public schools, regressive schemes of taxation and benefit, unfair systems of policing and criminal law -- we see that there's very little constituency for fixing those problems.
I suspect that redistributive policies enjoy the popularity they do, because they give money to people who don't have it, and who would suffer harm without it. Giving money to hungry people so they can buy food is popular, because hunger is a simple harm which easily triggers the sentiment of empathy. (This contrasts with the complex causal processes underlying structural inequality.) I've got no evidence for this supposition, of course, but at least it's not immediately falsified by casual observation....
"Fixing structural imbalances" is overwhelmingly unlikely to be the reason why most people support transfers. We can see that this, because when we make a list of things that promote structural inequality in the US -- such as the War on Drugs, the poor quality of public schools, regressive schemes of taxation and benefit, unfair systems of policing and criminal law -- we see that there's very little constituency for fixing those problems.
I suspect that redistributive policies enjoy the popularity they do, because they give money to people who don't have it, and who would suffer harm without it. Giving money to hungry people so they can buy food is popular, because hunger is a simple harm which easily triggers the sentiment of empathy. (This contrasts with the complex causal processes underlying structural inequality.) I've got no evidence for this supposition, of course, but at least it's not immediately falsified by casual observation....
stephen
"We redistribute out of a desire to fix structural imbalances that unduly harm some.
To rip off Hanson a bit, perhaps "we" redistribute to signal solidarity and concern for the poor. Maybe not, but I buy it.
For instance:
"I can see an argument where it is unfair to have your money taxed away from you. To think that this unfairness is equal or even comparable to the unfairness of being born into poverty and all of its attendant suffering just doesn't compute for me."
So in this scenario being born poor and having your money are both considered unfair, albeit unequally. Taxation is necessary because some people are poor, and some people are poor because they were born poor. It would then follow that both unfairnesses have same root cause: poor people having children. The logical solution would be to require people to have the means to pay for their children before they have them. But, of course, this would send the wrong signal.
To rip off Hanson a bit, perhaps "we" redistribute to signal solidarity and concern for the poor. Maybe not, but I buy it.
For instance:
"I can see an argument where it is unfair to have your money taxed away from you. To think that this unfairness is equal or even comparable to the unfairness of being born into poverty and all of its attendant suffering just doesn't compute for me."
So in this scenario being born poor and having your money are both considered unfair, albeit unequally. Taxation is necessary because some people are poor, and some people are poor because they were born poor. It would then follow that both unfairnesses have same root cause: poor people having children. The logical solution would be to require people to have the means to pay for their children before they have them. But, of course, this would send the wrong signal.
1 month ago
in Happiness and Income Inequality on Will Wilkinson
But it doesn’t so much bother meritocrats.
The problem is, meritocrats so often have a naive or outright incorrect view on whether something is the product of merit or of other factors.
The problem is, meritocrats so often have a naive or outright incorrect view on whether something is the product of merit or of other factors.
1 reply
Will Wilkinson
Yes, when the effect of a variable is ideologically mediated, it can be annoying that some people have the wrong ideology. Likewise, egalitarians often have a naive or outright incorrect view on the causes of inequality.
2 months ago
in The Moral Psychology of David Brooks on Will Wilkinson
Atheism is not a project. It has no aims; it proceeds towards no ends. There is no logical connection between a personal absence of belief and a desire to spread that absence. I am an atheist, my neighbors or not. Who cares? To the extent that they might want to govern public policy in accord with religious doctrine, I'll oppose them; but joined in that opposition are many theists. Indeed, I find many progressive Christians among the most full-throated opponents of the encroachment of religion into the public square. The desire to keep public policy removed from religion is in no way more logical for an atheist than it is for a theist, and many proceed under exactly that understanding.
Absent of those questions of religion intruding on public policy, there is no reason for an atheist to want to convert anyone, indeed no reason whatsoever to care, and to think that there is demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of atheism, religion and liberty.
Absent of those questions of religion intruding on public policy, there is no reason for an atheist to want to convert anyone, indeed no reason whatsoever to care, and to think that there is demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of atheism, religion and liberty.
2 replies
Kevin
While I agree with you that Atheists shouldn't care about converting others (and I am an atheist, and I really don't care). I think you and I are free riders on the argumentative atheism of others. Their pathological need to convert others makes them look unreasonable and extreme, while we look like sensible moderates by comparison. Without these atheists storming around, the religious types (who really are distrustful of atheists of all stripes) end up focusing on the "unhinged" Dawkins/Hitchens types, instead of attacking people like us.
Duncan
I don't think that's quite complete. There are other cases that spring to mind from personal experience.
One pressing reason I might want to 'push' atheism is if I think someone's religious faith is doing them more harm than good. A friend of mine was concerned over his violation of - what I would say were - some rather anti-human precepts of the catholic faith. So over a few evenings we walked our way through the theology and the philosophy of religion (a little, dare I say, more critically than the person who taught him 'religious studies A-level' had done) and he eventually decided he didn't really believe it after all, and over time has ceased to worry himself about such things. I'd like to think I did my friend a service, and in any event would do the same in other conditions.
Another reason I might want to 'push' atheism is if someone asks me. For better or worse certain positions I held at university marked me out as a 'known atheist', and every so often strangers would send me messages and the like saying 'I'm having doubts about my religion, what do you think I should do'. In each case I told them basically the same things: I told them why I didn't believe what they were being taught, gave them some book recommendations and encouraged them to keep going to their church or whatever anyway to decide for themselves whether they could reconcile their changing worldview with their religious practice. Lacking follow-ups I don't know if it resulted in no change at all (it was a wobble) or a partial (Anglicanism where once there was Evangelicalism) or total deconversion but I don't think my time was wasted either way.
Finally there's the claim that you might feel free to scoff at but which has been pushed by a large number of atheists and which I am tempted to endorse that given the atheistic worldview appears to me at least to be the correct one, there are certain aesthetic reasons for holding it rather than an alternative variously summed up by colloquial expressions such as 'living in the real world', 'not kidding yourself' and so on. Now, right enough this isn't going to push me on a massive crusade to 'deconvert the heathens' but nevertheless if it's someone that's close to me, I think there's a case for thinking it's my 'non-christian duty' to encourage them to question their religious convictions. Indeed, to think otherwise seems to me to be a little patronising. I would like to think that if I structured my life around an idea, and there were people out there with (what they take to be) good reasons for thinking that my idea is false, then if they care about me they'll do me the courtesy of telling me what those reasons are rather than just shrugging their shoulders and saying 'they seem happy enough'.
So, while I agree with what you are saying up to a point I really think there are cases where a bit of 'preaching the bad news' might well be called for.
Best wishes,
Duncan Crowe.
One pressing reason I might want to 'push' atheism is if I think someone's religious faith is doing them more harm than good. A friend of mine was concerned over his violation of - what I would say were - some rather anti-human precepts of the catholic faith. So over a few evenings we walked our way through the theology and the philosophy of religion (a little, dare I say, more critically than the person who taught him 'religious studies A-level' had done) and he eventually decided he didn't really believe it after all, and over time has ceased to worry himself about such things. I'd like to think I did my friend a service, and in any event would do the same in other conditions.
Another reason I might want to 'push' atheism is if someone asks me. For better or worse certain positions I held at university marked me out as a 'known atheist', and every so often strangers would send me messages and the like saying 'I'm having doubts about my religion, what do you think I should do'. In each case I told them basically the same things: I told them why I didn't believe what they were being taught, gave them some book recommendations and encouraged them to keep going to their church or whatever anyway to decide for themselves whether they could reconcile their changing worldview with their religious practice. Lacking follow-ups I don't know if it resulted in no change at all (it was a wobble) or a partial (Anglicanism where once there was Evangelicalism) or total deconversion but I don't think my time was wasted either way.
Finally there's the claim that you might feel free to scoff at but which has been pushed by a large number of atheists and which I am tempted to endorse that given the atheistic worldview appears to me at least to be the correct one, there are certain aesthetic reasons for holding it rather than an alternative variously summed up by colloquial expressions such as 'living in the real world', 'not kidding yourself' and so on. Now, right enough this isn't going to push me on a massive crusade to 'deconvert the heathens' but nevertheless if it's someone that's close to me, I think there's a case for thinking it's my 'non-christian duty' to encourage them to question their religious convictions. Indeed, to think otherwise seems to me to be a little patronising. I would like to think that if I structured my life around an idea, and there were people out there with (what they take to be) good reasons for thinking that my idea is false, then if they care about me they'll do me the courtesy of telling me what those reasons are rather than just shrugging their shoulders and saying 'they seem happy enough'.
So, while I agree with what you are saying up to a point I really think there are cases where a bit of 'preaching the bad news' might well be called for.
Best wishes,
Duncan Crowe.
3 months ago
in The Meaning Dodge on Will Wilkinson
I guess I feel the same way about this as I do about everything you write, which is that you have made a massive bet, a bet based on your certainty considering certain scientific or pseudo-scientific claims-- the ability of economic growth to deliver people out of poverty and into abundance, the ability of everything in life to be quantified, the ability of the human consciousness to escape the massive web of language in which its caught. You are so certain. But it's a big gamble. Often I wonder if you recognize how big.
2 replies
DWAnderson
It is an argument not a bet. If one were to bet, they might discount based on p<1 of the argument being valid, but why do that in ordinary discourse, especially when (i) it's hard to quantify what you think p might be, and (ii) it doesn't affect the validity of the argument.
3 months ago
in Dani Rodrik on Simon Johnson on Will Wilkinson
Well, to take just one example, the ability of moneyed interests to lobby economically and make campaign contributions that lead to the passage of bills that benefit fewer people over more. Take, for example, a powerful local business interest who uses his money to influence the local zoning board to make it impossible for smaller competition to move in. Happens all the time. Maybe more people want the competitor in the community. Then it's undermining democracy. Maybe the competitor could provide a better economic service or achieve better profits. Then it's undermining the market. Now, I find this sort of thing to be true in any system, not just the democracy/capitalism fusion which we (and I include myself) prefer. But you get a lot of people who just deny that this sort of thing happens, which is bizarre to me.
Economic power can trump democratic power in our system, and in fact it happens all the time. The appropriate and ethical way to prevent that sort of thing is a big question, of course. But there are certainly many means that those with economic power have to undermine what we consider social legitimate transactions. Some of them are actually illegal, but many of them are just unfair.
Economic power can trump democratic power in our system, and in fact it happens all the time. The appropriate and ethical way to prevent that sort of thing is a big question, of course. But there are certainly many means that those with economic power have to undermine what we consider social legitimate transactions. Some of them are actually illegal, but many of them are just unfair.
2 replies
Paul_G_Brown
The bigger and more involved in our lives government is, the more incentive there is for business to get into bed with government.
To which I would sing "Amen!" and offer the following corollary.
The smaller and less involved in our lives government is, the more opportunity there is for business to get involved.
Ideally, I would pox both their houses. In practice, it's prudent to play one against the other.
To which I would sing "Amen!" and offer the following corollary.
The smaller and less involved in our lives government is, the more opportunity there is for business to get involved.
Ideally, I would pox both their houses. In practice, it's prudent to play one against the other.
uknowbetter
The bigger and more involved in our lives government is, the more incentive there is for business to get into bed with government.
3 months ago
in Why Climate Alarmism Alarms Me on Will Wilkinson
Teleology is (still) one of the greatest intellectual diseases of mankind. And you're Typhoid Mary.
1 reply
Will Wilkinson
What does that even mean? That I think it is possible for poor people to not languish in poverty forever? I'm surely against smugly delusive tradeoff-denying "green" thinking and vicious complacency. Is that pro-teleology?
4 months ago
in Interconnected Crises? Independently Urgent Emergencies? Whatever It Takes! on Will Wilkinson
Well, while I'm clearly unqualified to say, I think that the plan is to buy up bad assets, provide direct cash infusions to attempt to unfreeze the credit markets, and then change regulations to prevent this kind of thing from happening in the future, by limiting the amount of leveraging banks and insurers can do, and putting strict limitations on securitization and similar tomfoolery.
The Keynesians would say that the additional investments into health care, transportation, infrastructure, energy and other places are the necessary kind of stimulative practices that you need in any recession, as well as satisfying genuine public needs as well.
The Keynesians would say that the additional investments into health care, transportation, infrastructure, energy and other places are the necessary kind of stimulative practices that you need in any recession, as well as satisfying genuine public needs as well.
1 reply
Paul G. Brown
I think that the plan is to buy up bad assets, provide direct cash infusions to attempt to unfreeze the credit markets,
I rather think the plan is to muddle along for a while until nationalizing The Big Four Banks (Citi, JP Morgan, Bank of America and AIG) becomes politically palatable. Or perhaps - until we've thought through, in considerable detail, what is to be the design of the next great regulatory era.
I rather think the plan is to muddle along for a while until nationalizing The Big Four Banks (Citi, JP Morgan, Bank of America and AIG) becomes politically palatable. Or perhaps - until we've thought through, in considerable detail, what is to be the design of the next great regulatory era.
4 months ago
in Interconnected Crises? Independently Urgent Emergencies? Whatever It Takes! on Will Wilkinson
Back in our salad days, the likes of Matt and Ezra mocked this very metaphor when it was rolled out to compare the immesne fiscal imbalance of Social Security to the even immenser imbalance of Medicare because Social Security was just fine, and so didn’t even count as a scratch. Of course now we have imminently terminal cancer and heart disease and rickets and gout and apparently also Alzheimers.
True, but then, that comes from a genuine disagreement about the relative importance of each set of problems.
True, but then, that comes from a genuine disagreement about the relative importance of each set of problems.
1 reply
Will Wilkinson
Very true. Do you think there is a current crisis to which socialized health care, free money for college kids (and the loyal Democrats who instruct them), and "green" energy industrial policy is an answer?
So what's the Treasury's plan for dealing with failing banks again?
So what's the Treasury's plan for dealing with failing banks again?
I am not asking if gay marriage is moral. I don't care.
I am asking what makes your use of the paragraph, and here I will quote you again, different from other folks using the paragraph.
Here's what you said:
"But what alternative? People need little excuse to abdicate any moral obligation at all. What if the choice is piety or apathy? I'll take piety, thanks. And I don't think that the fact that something is impossible means we have no obligation to pursue it. In fact, I think impossible pursuits are some of our most important."
I am saying that I can see this paragraph prefacing some awful, *AWFUL* policies (among them: gay marriage).
I am saying that I cannot see the difference between your use of this paragraph (to serve moral precepts X) and the use of those other, wickeder, folks use of it (to serve immoral precepts Y).
When you say "your post would be flatly unworkable as a statement of practical politics."
I am saying this: It does not seem to be particularly unworkable. The people in the examples I provided give examples of exactly how "workable" it is.
Again: What makes your use of the paragraph of yours that I quoted and their use of it?
(For the record, I see "troll behavior" as "talking about the person making the post" rather than "talking about the arguments the people are making". I am asking you about stuff that you posted. I am not talking about you. Please answer the questions I am asking or, at least, say "you know what, I'm not going to answer that". Thank you.)