DISQUS

Don't be disillusioned Will. Nothingness is a concept which a lot of philosophers struggle over.

'My broader point is that the social sciences have a normative upshot. We care about how we measure and reason about the social world because we want to make the social world better. '

Surely this is true for science in general. We study economics because we want to learn how best to manipulate policy to acheive the desired results. We study physics because we want to learn how best to manipulate the rules we discover to acheive the desired results.

Also, to monkyboy. The difference between predictability in the hard and the social science is by degree. It's all down to how far individual variables can be isolated and tested. This being true advances in neuroscience may well be the key to narrowing the gap.

Iren, your claims both look erroneous to me.

You claim that social security is ameliorating the wider fiscal crisis claimed by the paper Will references because it takes in more than it's putting out. If you read the measure they use again, "Fiscal Imbalance", you'll see that the calculation is based both on present and projected future cash flows. The long-term obligations tied to the current social security setup are a significant factor.

Secondly, where did Will 'concede there is no crisis'? You appear to have read between the lines and found something which wasn't there.

asg, can I not just bat him about a little bit?

*sulks*

I don't think cheery people are real libertarians (he said, before running for cover).

loy, could I have an example?

On my point, I think a good example would be in policing. Policing a law which is generally accepted (and therefore, I'm going to say, less intrusive) is much less costly than policing one which is controversial (prohibition being the obvious example). The more individuals feel that breaking the law is a matter of personal liberty the harder it needs to be enforced to make it effective, and therefore the more costly.

I can't immediately think of an example of a regulation which would be seriously illibertarian but not cost very much to enforce.

That was phrased poorly. What I meant to say was that although measuring government spending does not perfectly capture intrusiveness, a government which is more intrusive will necessarily spend more because the less popular a regulation the harder and costlier it is to enforce. Because the negative effect of intrusive regulation is harder to measure measuring size by reference to spending is a decent approximation.

loyopp,

agree'd that intrusive regulations are a part of the size of government. However, any effective regulation relies on spending to enforce it, whether through a new oversight body or the expanding of powers for existing ones. Therefore while size is not a definitive indication of intrusiveness there is a rough correlation between the two.

I guesstimate government size in terms of the scale of its influence.

A government which spends 98% of gdp is vast. A government which taxes but gives back all but 2% is tiny (but why would this ever happen?).

My only practical concern over euthanasia is the possibility that insufficiently strict regulations could lead to people who don't want to live being duped/bullied into accepting euthanasia by unscrupulous interested parties. I have no ethical objections to the idea of euthanasia itself (though I suspect this places me in a minority).

Hi Will, good post.

I said much the same thing on the Left2right site last night. I'm glad i'm not the only one who thinks that teaching critical analysis is more important than teaching our kids to memorise the scientific facts we've so far discovered.

Hits 60 is the most erudite commentator I've seen in a while.

'My position is more along the lines of not understanding how libertarians could possibly justify them, not people in general.'

Matt gave a handily succinct answer to this question above. I've tried to say something similar, but ended up waffling.


I think it would be useful here to repeat the example of power projection I gave.

'The key example I gave above was the current situation in the Ukraine. If, hypothetically, an election which could be proven to be rigged led to a popular uprising which was then suppressed by Russian or Russian supported military power, America would have a clear business responding. The projection of US (military and economic) and European (economic) power is, in fact, a big factor in keeping Russia from intervening more forcefully to protect its perceived sphere of influence.'

Your response:

'It seems to me that under this doctrine, the U.S. government would have the right, if not the responsibility, to overturn every other government in existance that we do not consider sufficiently democratic and/or sufficiently legitimate.'

Now, your claim is so obviously different from and wider than mine, that the slippery slope was the only thing I could think you might be arguing.

Howevever, apparently I was wrong:

'But this is not the argument I've used. My argument is of the following form: "P is conceptually indistinguishible from Q. If we are not willing to apply the same reasoning to Q as we are to P, we are being inconsistent." Note that this is not the same as saying that doing P will cause us to do Q; it is merely an argument that we should treat like things alike and reason consistently.'

If you're genuinely arguing that there is no difference between protecting a current democracy from external or externally funded military aggression, and attacking those stable countries we consider insufficiently democratic, I can only say that you're wrong. There is a significant difference. The US government is not obliged in either case to intervene, but where US interests are at stake a clear case can be made in the first instance for the right to intervene.


'There's nothing wrong with using one's own judgement.'

Good, we're agreed.


'There is something wrong with having no standards/justifications/reasons to explain one's own positions, and at the same time expect others to agree with your positions.'

There's something wrong with expecting others to agree regardless of the standards/justifications/reasons provided. I don't recall doing that over the course of this discussion.

'If every case is a new case, with no overarching principles or standards for comparison, and each new moral dilemma can only be resolved by consulting one's private moral intuition, then moral discussion is largely impossible.'

Every case IS a new case. The overarching principles or standards for comparison are useful in educating judgement, but they will never replace it. Likewise, the purpose of moral discussion is to educate and improve individual decision making. I don't quite understand the idea that it is only useful if some situations are exactly the same as some others.

I'm still not quite sure how any of this renders me akin to a 6 year old, but I'm sure we'll get to that.

'Oh, I thought we were talking about the war in Iraq. Silly me.'

No, your arguments re: the war in Iraq are mostly sound. I jumped in when you generalised your argument to war in general.

'And while I'm no expert in just war theory, the belief that international war is justified only in cases of self-defense is certainly not a novel or unpopular one'

Just war theory is similar conceptually to the UN. Lip service has been paid to it since its inception, but whenever leaders perceive the need to act, the tenets are either ignored or fudged.


'Humanitarian wars for the promotion of "democracy" and "liberty" abroad are a fairly recent invention, and not a very popular one, globally speaking.'

Quite agree, but these are just a small subset of the wars which have been fought over many centuries to protect interests beyond a country's borders. These wars do happen, and always have happened, with wide public support. Claiming that they shouldn't is absolutely fine, but if you claim that you can't understand how people could possibly justify them, then that is a lack of understanding on your part.


With regard to 'i don't know what posts you've been reading.....' I've been reading yours.

I gave a specific instance in the Ukraine in which I consider projection of power would be absolutely justified. You said 'If this were justified, it seems to me that we'd have the RIGHT, if not the RESPONSIBILITY, to overturn democratic governments elsewhere'.

No, we wouldn't. One instance is not a series of different instances. I bring the slippery slope issue up in just about every discussion with you, because it's almost always relevant. Making a judgement call on one particular foreign policy implies nothing about the justification of other hypothetical foreign policies.

And with regard to:

'I'm glad we can reach an agreement. You've certainly expounded a serious and practical political philosophy - one familiar and extensively used by six-year-olds:

"But mom, I don't want to go to sleep yet!" "But mom, I want more ice cream!" Color me and mom convinced.'

If you're not using your own judgement in this discussion, can you direct me to the person who is telling you which positions to take? I might be better off talking to them :).

'Of course, when taking world opinion into account, I fall squarely in the vast majority. If we are appealing to public opinion to resolve points of disagreement related to justice, it is not at all clear why we should prefer the opinions of Americans to the opinion of the world at large.'

You seriously think that the vast majority of the world agree with you that projection of power beyond borders is never justified except explicitly in defence, or did you forget what was being discussed?

'How is my position "never"? I've given numerous examples and conditions under which I believe war with foreign entities is justified.'

It's interesting, on the one hand you rail against anyone who claims that projection of power in the pursuit of strategic interests is sometimes justified, using your favoured slippery slope argument (the, to my mind bizarre 'if we determine that this instance is justified, how can we claim that that entirely different instance is not?'). On the other hand, you baulk at the idea that your position is 'never'. You can't have this one both ways.


"war is justified whenever I feel it is justified, and unjustified whenever I don't."

You have stated my position in a nutshell, and the only sensible position to have. Judgement on a situation by situation basis is the way political decisions are always made.

Why on earth would anyone think that war was unjustified on the basis that they felt it justified?

'Little practical value in terms of foreign policy? I don't even know how to begin to address that.'

And that is where your problem lies. You don't even know where to begin to address a point of contention on which you fall squarely in the minority. If you wish to convince us that no intervention is justified under any circumstances except direct attack on the US, you need to explain how that policy will benefit Americans more than the current policy of projected stability (pax Americana) and considered intervention (often poorly realised on the 'considered' part). Claiming only that you don't understand why America projects power will not sway the people who do.

The discussion on foreign intervention, as I see it, is 'under what circumstances?' and 'with what goals?', rather than either Mclain's 'always' or your 'never'.

You're certainly a worthy poster child for the Creationist movement.

'But I do recognize a distinction between defensive war and offensive nation building, even when done for supposed humanitarian reasons.'

The key example I gave above was the current situation in the Ukraine. If, hypothetically, an election which could be proven to be rigged led to a popular uprising which was then suppressed by Russian or Russian supported military power, America would have a clear business responding. The projection of US (military and economic) and European (economic) power is, in fact, a big factor in keeping Russia from intervening more forcefully to protect its perceived sphere of influence.

If libertarianism precluded this (I don't believe it does), then the ideology would have little practical value in terms of foreign policy.

I suspected this wasn't worth my time. Curse my optimism.

'The arguments McClain has given in favor of the war in Iraq could be used to justify any and every conceivable government action, no matter how coercive. If this is libertarianism, then libertarianism has no meaning.'

And were I he, that would be absolutely relevant to me. As I've said, most of your rebuttal looks very sound to me. The difficulty I have is with what I believe to be your claim that libertarianism precludes the projection of power internationally.

As I've made clear, I don't believe it does.

Chuck, I've long wondered the same thing about cheerleaders.

Of course, if you watch the right documentaries you get to see how they behave together in their natural habitat.

Rob, my patience for dishonesty is extremely thin.

You accused me of using a 'bait and switch' tactic because I narrowed your own strawman definition of evolution. The low-grade rhetorical trick was yours, not mine. My definition of evolution has remained consistent throughout.

'It also demonstrates the common confusion among proponents of Evolution of the actual positions of the leading Creationists.'

Rhetorical trick number 2 was to frame my own discussion in the context of every other argument you'd ever heard for evolution. It's an intriguing irony given that in the very same sentence you accuse your opponents of doing the very same thing you're doing:

'(they love to argue against their favorite crackpots all day... the kind that say things like "dinasaurs never existed", etc.,)'


Rhetorical trick number 3 is to throw out large numbers of unconnected links without any supporting analysis on your part. This is a particular problem with the statistical analysis link. If you want us to pore over statistics, you have to first provide a succinct explanation of the mechanism they are based on. Creationist statistics are almost always used to debunk their own 'random chance' strawman, which you've now used twice yourself. If you can't convince us you understand the basics, then you're not the right person to discuss any of the complexities with.


'For those too lazy to read the links... let me clairify again:'

Rhetorical trick number 4.


Rhetorical trick number 5 is to focus entirely on the weaknesses you perceive with evolution. I pointed out in my first post that biblical creationism fails on its own merits. If you want to promote it, i'd suggest you do so.


Rhetorical trick number 6 is the argument from authority you use with reference to Richard Dawkin. Not even he, you claim, can think of a single example of benign genetic mutation.

I read up a little on this, and what did I find?

http://www.ntskeptics.org/1999/1999august/august1999.htm

As it transpires, not only are you falling into the trap of assuming that if Richard Dawkin can't answer a question then there can't be an answer, you're actually peddling a ridiculously contrived scenario in the first place. This is not a route to respectability.


Is this to be a real discussion or not?

'This is a bit of a "bait-n-switch"'

You'll have to forgive me. I have no idea what a 'bait and switch' is. Can you explain?

'It also demonstrates the common confusion among proponents of Evolution of the actual positions of the leading Creationists.'

It does? How?


'(they love to argue against their favorite crackpots all day... the kind that say things like "dinasaurs never existed", etc.,) '

Or the kinds who claim that the earth is only 6000 years old?


I'll leave the 'usually within a species, always within a genus....' stuff, because the boundaries are pushed back as new evidence with regard to speciation is discovered. Leading creationists used to swear blind that speciation never occurred at all, and most biblical creationists will still use the question 'Can you show me just one example of macroevolution?'. I fully expect that in 5 years time there will be an even larger body of evidence, and the leading creationists will be arguing over an even smaller set of gaps in our understanding.


And then the long treatise on mutations. Ending with the beautiful quote:

'Dr. Lee Spetner contends that, given such astronomically low percentages of additive mutations found in nature, in order to have enough additive mutations for Evolution to occur, the harmful mutations would kill you many times over.'

Which demonstrates a key misconception about evolutionary biology. Harmful mutations do kill large numbers of creatures of all kinds on an ongoing basis. Those creatures that are less apt because of harmful mutations are less likely to reproduce (the more harmful the mutation, the less likely it is to be passed on). Beneficial mutations, on the other hand, are more likely to be passed on (though there are no guarantees), and so the fact that beneficial mutations are rarer than malignant ones is no barrier to the latter being spread.

On the assertion that beneficial mutations may never occur. This is simply and categorically false:

http://www.talkorigins.org/indexcc/CB/CB101.html

Rob, I'm feeling bored, so I'll bite. Several things:

Firstly, your definition of evolution is silly. Evolution is simply a study of the mechanics by which life adapts and changes over time. The idea that it can only be proven by demonstrating that '...ALL life descended from a single-celled creature millions of years ago and the engine for this was mutations combined with natural selection.' is equivalent to challenging that a particular model of gravity can only be proven by demonstrating that 'each and every object has been attracted to each and every other object in such and such a way since the beginning of time'. Evolution can easily be demonstrated.

Secondly, and related to the first point. Evolution is not definitively at odds with the idea that the universe was created. The idea that the universe was created is not a question which can be established through empirical testing, so science doesn't approach it. The variations on biblical creationism (old earth, young earth, etc.) do make specific claims which are at odds with scientific disciplines including but not limited to geology, astronomy, cladistics and, of course, evolutionary biology. It's not a case of 'either evolution is true of biblical creationism is true', it's a case of 'biblical creationism isn't true, while our understanding of evolutionary biology increases with every year of additional research.'

Thirdly, the idea that if something is true then a 10 year old should be able to understand is clearly very silly. If you showed two mathematical proofs for pythagoras' theorom to the average ten year old, one of which was accurate and the other of which was full of holes, they would have no idea which was which. In practice, reality is as complicated as we can cope with understanding.


Hope this helps.

"The proper role for the U.S. government, from a libertarian perspective, is not to make the world a more libertarian place, but to make the U.S. a more libertarian place. We are not the world's policeman."

Micha, I agree wholeheartedly with a significant part of your argument. The only point i'd make is the one I made above. All ideology leaves room for significant disagreement on foreign policy objectives. If libertarian ideology specifically precluded the projection of power internationally to protect American interests then very few people indeed would be libertarian. As the current situation in the Ukraine shows, liberalising reform frequently needs protection in order to survive and benefit us in the long term. The discussion, as far as i'm concerned, is when and with what objectives the US should intervene in the world, rather than whether it ever ought to at all.