DISQUS

Noting that physical attractions are unpredictable is a far cry from proving that one's life partner is best chosen by those attractions alone.

In my own experience, I first "noticed" my partner of six years because he was attractive to me--but I remained interested in him because we had very similar values, interests, and tastes. In the end, it really was a rational decision: If pressed, I could certainly enumerate the reasons why I love him, by comparing him directly to his rivals, who (after six years of growing together) are virtually nonexistent.

Eh.

It should read "...productive, rational life--because this is the best possible chance we have..."

Objectivists say that selfless activity is immoral (it's been awhile since I read Rand), and then the Objectivists go around trying to convince you, for your good, that they are right.

This is an inaccurate description of Objectivist motives. In spreading their philosophy, Objectivists claim to be creating--selfishly--the type of society they would prefer to live in.

Also, I think Rand's use of "happiness" may be a bit misleading: She is not suggesting that we live for mere pleasure or physical enjoyment, although she certainly has no problems with these things. Instead, she advocates a full, flourishing, productive, rational life--because the best possible chance we have toward happiness, and also because this is how humans are designed to live. (I know Will has objections to the second half of this argument, as he holds that reason is not how humans are designed to live. I am curious what he thinks of the first half, however... Does rationality offer our best chance at happiness? Or is some other method more probable?)

Will,

Unwitting Objectivists have tremendous bearing on the argument, as Objectivists claim that these people are more likely to be happy than others. I do not accept that this claim is necessarily circular as you suggest it is. More evidence is needed on both sides before it can be tested, and I'm content to let it rest at that.

In my second comment, I don't think that I was arguing for a theory of rational self-deception; on the contrary, I was arguing precisely against such a theory--by suggesting that it would be difficult or impossible in practice. I was arguing above all that those who achieve the celebrated old-mystical-happy life are merely lucky, not virtuous, and that we ought not to try emulating them. Our luck might not be so good as theirs--particularly if we know up front that we are trying to deceive ourselves.

Second, you write, "you can't say that we just now finally discovered rational ethics, AND that adhering to a rational ethics was an objectively necessary requirement for life ALL ALONG." But this is a distortion of Rand's position. She claimed to be the first to find a fully rational ethics, but that many people had discovered bits and pieces of it before, particularly capitalist economists, Aristotle as relates to the individual, Aquinas when he wasn't being mystical, and a few others.

Her claim is not, then, preposterous just on its face. But I do happen to doubt it all the same: I find many other Aristotelians to be just as rational as she was, and also I find that quite often Rand herself was irrational. She makes a mistaken claim in my view, but not a preposterous one, and certainly not one that sinks the whole philosophy.

Incidentally, I don't recall Aristotle ever saying that one should purposefully turn off one's reason. This is really what the first question of the second post was addressing, and I still do not think that there is any time when turning off one's reason--that is, acting irrationally--can ever be justified. Habits of reason, though, are quite a different matter, and these should not be lumped in with irrational behavior.

Two more questions: 1.) Once you decide (rationally?) to turn reason off--how do you later decide to turn it back on again? Is that not an act of reason? Or shouldn't it be? If you let your unreasoned thinking determine when to use reason (and when not to), then which part of you is really in charge?

2.) After reading your response to Tim, I'd like to modify my statements above: It may be possible for someone to live quite happily as a parasite, provided they never identify the root cause of their success, which will, in a rational person, eventually cause them to feel guilt and unhappiness. Could it be, though, that this process takes longer for some than for others, and that this explains how some people manage to be old, happy, and mystical? If this mechanism explains things, then (rationally?) aiming at becoming old, happy, and mystical is a distinctly risky bargain.

The first objection I can think of to your argument is that many people DO act according to the Objectivist ethics even while they deny it or do not realize it consciously. This keeps them going to the point where they can live very happy lives and never notice anything wrong, except that their philosophical ideas seem to contradict the way that they act in real life.

Reason is natural, in a sense, because it is an attempt to pattern our thoughts after nature--that is, after what we are able to learn of the world around us. We are bound to its norms because, while it won't kill you instantly or every time, deviations from reason offer a mere shot in the dark compared to what reason is likely to offer.

Lastly, I don't think it's so strange to claim that a fully rational ethics has only just lately been discovered. Considering the religious fanaticism, crude theories of human nature, and utter ignorance about good political systems that prevailed for most of human history, I think there is at least a prima facie case that we haven't known at all what we were doing for most of human history. In part the results can be seen in how premodern societies really did contain vastly more starvation, disease and illiteracy. And those results return whenever governments and societies deviate far enough from a reasoned approach to life, a market economy, and a regime of individual rights.

She reminds me most of the philosophical novels of the high enlightenment, which no one really reads anymore--except for Candide. But once there was an entire genre like this, from Rousseau's Emile, to Mercier's The Year 2440, to Diderot's La Religieuse. More even than the 19th-century novelists, Rand's novelistic style comes from the 18th, as it virtually had to do: No other style would have allowed her to make complex, conceptual arguments in philosophy--as opposed to vague allegories.

"in general, men prefer women who are more typically feminine and women prefer men who are more typically masculine."

Take even a brief look at, say, the ideal of masculinity espoused in 18th-century Europe, and you will begin to question whether there is anything essential about masculinity. These guys were our ancestors, yet they dressed and acted in ways that, well, would get them beaten up today: Wearing wigs and makeup, lace and silk, even high heels for crying out loud...

Historically, there is a massive amount of evidence that gender roles have changed over time. Experientially, we all seem to want what we want, and social construction be damned. I don't have an answer for why this is, but I agree with several others on this thread--It's part of the reason I'm glad I'm a libertarian.

It's funny, I need men to be men too.

Monkyboy,

If you don't like it, there are plenty of other blogs to choose from. Heck, you even seem to realize this yourself, albeit rather dimly.

There are some bitter libertarians out there, but I avoid them at all costs.

I think one reason that libertarians are happier is that a lot of us have been touched by Ayn Rand at one point or another, and her philosophy placed tremendous emphasis on the virtue of pursuing one's own happiness. She also believed that if you went about it rationally, attaining happiness really was possible. Maybe we've succeeded?

If the money were right, I would work anywhere, strictly speaking.

INTJ and have been since high school.

You aren't by any chance thinking of Isaiah Berlin's essays on the role of philosophy, perhaps? He seemed to suggest that philosophy might eventually run its course, once all man's questions were recognized as susceptible to either deductive or empirical methods. As I recall, he dismissed this possibility--but you would seem to be bringing it up once more.

Let me give you a parallel from history, where our knowledge has never been greater, but where the discipline does not seem in danger of dying out. While it is true that very few new facts are discovered about, say Louis XIV, still, every new generation will have some interest in the past, and it will approach the past informed by a different set of interior questions: While the source matter of history is always the same, the audience changes all the time. New histories are necessary, using new language, new ways of thinking, new ways of relating the information and presenting it.

Even if western philosophy were ever reduced to a set of (admittedly complex) unchanging truths, wouldn't this kind of work still be necessary? And would that not be as fully an intellectual pursuit as discovering the ideas the first time around?

Congratulations. Consider me jealous!

"Well then tell me what you mean by your statement that the few that do exist are "merely mistaken.""

Okay, I will. I argue that the tiny percentage of homosexuals who argue against gay marriage because they think that gay marriage will destroy the traditional family are wrong. Gay marriage will not destroy the traditional family. I commend to you Johnathan Rauch's book on the subject and would suggest to you that his arguments about why gay marriage is actually a good thing are stronger than the arguments on the opposing side--no matter who happens to be articulating them.

The idea that the very few gay people who oppose gay marriage somehow should carry the argument is absurd. Some blacks opposed integration, and a considerable number of women opposed women's suffrage. The question should not be "who believes what?" but rather, "what is the right thing to believe?"

Uh.. Rob? I said that a "few" of them exist.

Proving that you've met a few of them does not contradict any of my claims, whether about their number, their fundamental mistakennes, or their usefulness to those who would sooner re-criminalize homosexuality altogether.

To reiterate: Yes, some gay people are against gay marriage on the conservative grounds you mention. As I recall, it's a percentage in the low single digits.

Beyond that, their commonness--and their importance--is mostly a figment of your imagination.

My own opinion is that such homosexuals as you name are mostly figments of your imagination.

The few that do exist are merely mistaken--though very useful politically for the religious right. We needn't go into the labyrinth of false consciousness at all.

As to the two definitions of the word "nature," they are not nearly so distinct as Shulamite would claim. At various times in human history, many innocuous things have been called unnatural and therefore immoral. These include lightning rods, anaesthesia, vaccination, women's suffrage, women's property ownership, in vitro fertilization, birth control, and even democracy itself. All of these go to show that our historical track record has been quite poor indeed when it comes to differentiating the two alledged senses of the word "natural."

And if certain acts really are unnatural--just as interracial marriage was said to be unnatural--then perhaps the government ought not to sanction those, either?