Disqus - Latest Comments for davemhahn

Re: Personal reflections on the therapeutic process: Learning from termination.

David Hahn — Wed, 17 Jun 2009 15:45:51 -0000

Agreed: I claimed simply that "theory," in the sense of a conceptual framework of what we do, is necessary whether we like it or not for the psychologist to do his job. "Theory" alone will not tell us how to talk to or deal with a "real person," and my comments above were not suggesting that it somehow would do the job all by itself.

Re: Personal reflections on the therapeutic process: Learning from termination.

David Hahn — Thu, 04 Jun 2009 19:03:03 -0000

I wonder whether the problem is to be understood not just in terms of theory/practice, but internal/external views of a situation. There's at least three viewpoints here: (a) the therapist in the room (b) the patient in the room and (c) the interpreter of the situation between (a) and (b) alone at one's desk after the session has ended. As Philip Rosenbaum, you happen to be both (a) and (c), which obviously complicates matters. How can we believe (a) is getting the situation right, or helping the patient at all, when we know (a) is the same person as (c), namely, Philip Rosenbaum? "Theory"--or whatever we call the thing that gives a working account of what you're doing--provides one way for us to at least check up on (a). What kind of account does (c) have of what (a)'s doing? Is it coherent? What does it value? How does it work exactly? "Theory" or working principles also give (a) some rough account of what he's doing--compromised and limited, yes--but a rough account nonetheless that seems necessary to start any work at all. Think about what it would be like if (c) didn't exist? It's nearly impossible to imagine, when you really start to press at it.

Re: Greek, Roman, American Affectation in Woody Allen’s Interiors (1978)

David Hahn — Wed, 25 Mar 2009 18:31:10 -0000

Stimulating piece. I'm glad to see Pearl brought in; she really does change the entire movie. I read some of her scenes, especially the squealer one, as a very dark movie's only form of comic relief: sometimes it seems like Pearl knows she's being ridiculous, and some of the characters (especially the husbands of the daughters) almost guffaw. But she is also mystical: re, the tarot card readings. What do you make of that?

Mostly, though, I'm curious as to how you might read the final scene, in which it is Pearl who saves Joey from drowning by administering some kind of CPR?

Importantly, Joey had just gone to save Eve (any resonance with that name?) from drowning herself. But only Joey emerges from the water, not breathing. Joey's husband drags her out of the water but it is Pearl who definitely takes control in that moment and saves Joey, breathing in her mouth until the water spurts back out.

Is Pearl, in fact, the Ugly American who saves the grand European soul, embodied in Eve but now transferred to Joey? Maybe there is a kind of continuation between the two (or three rather) forces in the movie, the American, Apollonian, and Dionysian?

Re: The Anti-Homosexual Counterpetition to the American Philosophical Association

David Hahn — Fri, 13 Mar 2009 16:57:23 -0000

I guess I was a little taken aback by the generality of your condemnation, the way it casts its net over the whole "analytic philosophical tradition." About the people who actually signed this petition, I agree with you wholeheartedly, and I think your diagnosis stands. But how representative are they, you think? After all, the text you're citing as a paradigmatic case of "analytic sophistry" is a counter-petition to an absolutely sane and responsible petition. The first petition, which urges the APA to stop its discriminatory practices, claims to have +750 in its first 60 hours. How many philosophers have signed or are going to sign the counter-petition? I doubt many, though here again maybe I'm being too optimistic.

Maybe the next step is to post seriously, non polemically, about what the real differences between analytic and continental philosophy might be. Maybe we can collaborate. Perhaps I went too far to make them seem as you say neatly reconciled. Point taken. Your diagnosis below, however, needs some serious re-working, because it misrepresents a great deal (not just outlying cases) of analytic philosophy, particularly when we think of ordinary language philosophy:

"their complete disregard for any kind of social or cultural-oriented dimension of language — so much so that even the clear-cut cases, like this one, can be borne away as so much semantics. And then, pulling up the rear, come their famous analogies, through which any politicized, contentious issue can be swiftly rendered, in the blink of an eye, harmless and oh so ordinary."

Re: The Anti-Homosexual Counterpetition to the American Philosophical Association

David Hahn — Fri, 13 Mar 2009 12:12:06 -0000

Slow down there doggy. First, let me second you: the distinction between acts and dispositions in this context is odious, since whatever we think of such distinctions (and Foucault famously was troubled by the same issue, History of Sexuality Vol 1) we all know that in this case, today, such distinctions will make it easier for people to discriminate against homosexuals. There is no defense of that, whatever your philosophical position on the subject might be. You're absolutely right when you call that language "misappropriated" in this context and the signers of this petition should be taken severely to task.

But the next paragraph I think goes too far:

"It would, in fact, be hard to come up with a better example of how the analytic philosophical tradition has been compromised in the deepest way conceivable by their complete disregard for any kind of social or cultural-oriented dimension of language"

"Complete disregard"? What about ordinary language philosophy, arguably the most important movement in analytic philosophy in the last century? One could say that the work of Wittgenstein and his followers (I'm thinking of Cavell especially), is all about the social and cultural-oriented dimension of language.

I think the whole analytic vs. continental polemic is largely a dead end. Such polemics are usually a sign that both sides have stopped thinking. Some of the best philosophers work in both and show that the opposition is artificial (I'm thinking of Cavell and Rorty especially), and as I see it the best philosophers in the analytic tradition (at least in ethics, which I know more than the other philosophical problem spaces), are deeply invested in politics, contentious issues, and freely engage a whole host of traditionally non-analytic texts: literature, art, and yes, continental philosophy (I'm thinking of the work of Bernard Williams and Martha Nussbaum; Williams seems to have thought of himself at the end of his career as being directly in Nietzsche's lineage, and constantly engages literature; Nussbaum has written several books about contentious political issues that she does not reduce to mere "language" issues, whatever that would mean).

I think your characterization might be right about some professional analytic philosophers but not all, and certainly not the best. And so what does it add up to? That any professional or academic field has a share of stupid, bigoted, morally dubious people should not surprise anyone. Thats not really a revelation, is it? We remember there are many stupid, bigoted, morally dubious people in the continental tradition (we can toss the Paul de Man grenade around sometime if we wish). In short, plenty of very smart people are bad people; we shouldn't let them off the hook in any way (especially here, when they misappropriate their philosophical vocabulary). But I would hazard you against making such a wide, polemical attack against the philosophical school itself.

In the spirit of inclusion, it would also be interesting to pair continental and analytic philosophers who are interested in similar issues, because I've found that one's understanding of a problem is increased by reading both simultaneously. I've done this by reading Williams on shame and Sartre on shame, and it was enriching. My simple plea is: why choose between analytic and continental? Why not have both? (Granted, not all philosophers on either side want both, but like I said I think that's small minded). There's good and bad in every philosophical tradition you pick, let's be honest. But to hunker down in one, whatever it is, seems wrong-headed. Lots of people do it for professional, disciplinary motives rather than purely intellectual reasons. The academy is a petty, hyper-competitive, oftentimes small-minded place. Again, there should be no revelation here.

In its most ambitious and indeed oldest conception of itself, philosophy is the search for truth. In real terms, now, the philosopher can help clarify and challenge our thinking about a whole range of issues (ethics, the mind, politics, etc etc). As I see it, that work of clarifying and challenging our thinking often takes two basic forms: the philosopher by the force of his argument tells you either that a) you are using a single big lumpy word or concept to cover a whole range of separate issues or b) the things that you so quickly and strongly separate are actually part of the same problem. In the first case (a), the philosopher will tend to make distinctions to show how one thing is really two; in the second case (b), the philosopher will tend to draw counter-intuitive parallels to show how two things are really one. I believe so-called analytic philosophy favors the (a) side, and so-called continental the (b) side, but they're after the same thing. They are best seen not so much as warring schools or embittered enemies; rather they embody different approaches or, better yet, different orientations. Irony intended.

Re: Macroeconomics and the Street, on The Wire

David Hahn — Thu, 12 Mar 2009 17:18:57 -0000

For an interesting piece that touches upon some of the issues we've been discussing, see this comparison of the Wire and the Western, from the Valve:

http://www.thevalve.org/go/...

Re: Macroeconomics and the Street, on The Wire

David Hahn — Tue, 10 Mar 2009 18:01:18 -0000

Ah, I now see what you mean. That makes sense. Ethos-ical: I like it! Maybe we can bring it in...

Re: Macroeconomics and the Street, on The Wire

David Hahn — Tue, 10 Mar 2009 13:58:43 -0000

Just to clarify, I'm wielding (perhaps too liberally) Bernard Williams's sense of the distinction between morality and ethics, and I think its important when talking not just about the Greeks but modern problems such as we see between Stringer and Avon (See esp Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, also Shame and Necessity). Your point below is a little confused, then:

"if it leans more toward the Aristotelian sense of ethos/character than toward questions of right and wrong, I question how helpful that term is, in light of its moral associations."

Ethos/character strictly speaking in the Aristotelian sense has little to do with "morality" or the "moral" as we understand the terms (as a set of obligations or duties, moral right, moral wrong, etc). To think of ethos/character as having "moral" associations is to impose Judeo-Christian, and perhaps post-Kantian, assumptions onto the term. Aristotle advocates behaviors and actions that we might find "morally" reprehensible.

This is what is so challenging about Aristotle, and also what I think drew moral philosophers in the last half century to him: how to understand an "ethos" that in some areas perhaps abuts, yet is by no means compatible with, our sense of the "moral." It seems increasingly relevant given the clunkiness of our "moral" vocabulary, rights and wrongs, etc, but that clunky probably won't go away anytime soon. So we have problems in understanding whether Tony, Avon, Stringer etc are doing the right/wrong thing, in what ways, etc

Re: Macroeconomics and the Street, on The Wire

David Hahn — Mon, 09 Mar 2009 15:36:08 -0000

Fascinating piece. I read the scene somewhat differently; it is not just possible for we the viewers to argue about whether the drug trade is or is not like a business, but the poignancy of the scene you picked is precisely that the characters themselves argue this very question. Now, perhaps from a third personal, moral, or explanatory perspective the two positions are not mutually exclusive (why CANT drug dealing be understood as both a maket based business and The Street? Levit shows us it can. Why can't it both be "right" and "wrong"--our confusing moral intuitions show us it can).

But it strikes me very powerfully that from the agent, first person perspective the views of both Avon and Stringer read quite differently. They are importantly incompatible (even if we the viewers decide that they might not REALLY be incompatible). Let's start with the argument itself.

Note how the substance of the Stringer/Avon argument is precisely whether whatever-it-is-they're-talking-about is best described as either "a market based business" (Stringer) or "that other thing. The Street the Street, always" (Avon). The ambiguity is stressed by the dialogue's structure: these are two criminals talking secretly about drugs, after all, so Stringer and Avon quickly switch to euphemism: they call whatever-it-is-they're-talking-about "it," "that thing," "this bullshit." But the vague euphemism is important, for after all their problem is one of description: what best to call this thing of theirs? This is no merely rhetorical or ideological exercise FOR THEM, but rather an ethical one: whatever you call it deeply changes who they think they are (soldier or business man?), the structure which organizes their lives and gives meaning to their actions. This is why I see this as an ethical argument (ethics in the Aristotelian sense of ethos or character, but also in the Harry Frankfurt sense of the importance of what we care about, etc). One might say that this is an ethical conflict precisely because it has to do with conflicting values and worldviews, and not just any values and worldviews, but the ones which propel the lives of these two people.

For Avon, "The Street" has something to do with a masculine warrior ethos clearly--notice his outrage at Stringer misunderstanding how to deal with "a soldier like Mouzon." But I think there's something deeper at stake when he says "The Street the Street, always"--he is giving expression to a worldview. The Street is neither morally good nor bad--it just IS this way, and won't change. At this point, whats so amazing is that it seems (at least to Avon) that he can't understand Stringer's position, but also that he can't understand who Stringer is anymore. What else could Avon's striking refusal to fist pump Stringer mean except that Stringer is no longer recognizable to him, and thus not worthy of his dignity and respect?

Now Stringer has his own view, of course, but it just as powerfully reaches down to Stringer's character, to who Stringer thinks he is. Stringer is not simply taking a business course; as you sharply pointed out, he is starting to take on the mannerisms of a tired business professor (taking off the eyeglasses, rubbing his forehead, teaching, analyzing, etc). His character is being changed--has changed already--by a complex of things, the most obvious of which has to do with the classes.

There is a practical solution to their problem, as Avon hits upon: while in prison, Stringer will continue to run it as he sees fit, while "When I get back" it will no doubt be a different situation. Perhaps all such ethical conflicts are solved by such practical expediency: but stay tuned for another confrontation between the Stringer and Avon...

Note: It would be interesting to bring Omar into this discussion, who clearly shares Avon's masculine warrior ethos (often referring to the "Game"), but whose sense of that ethos is of course tied directly to his homosexuality. He is like the tribe of Greek soldiers who proverbially fight harder for their male comrades because they are in love with them. Money never enters much into Omar's equation, interestingly.